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Preface 
 
This report presents the results of a study “Transition costs of reformed pension systems” 
(contract ref no VC/2007/0233) commissioned by the European Commission’s Directorate-
General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. The purpose of the study is 
to analyse transition costs faced by governments and individuals, and the impact of reforms on 
current and future pension adequacy in Member States that have implemented a pension 
reform with partial transition from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded pension scheme. 
 
A core research team affiliated with the PRAXIS Center for Policy Studies carried out the 
study: Lauri Leppik (Tallinn University) and Andres Võrk (University of Tartu), with the 
assistance of Kirsti Nurmela.  
 
The following country experts provided reports and data: 
• Georgi Shopov (Bulgaria) 
• Tõnu Lillelaid (Estonia) 
• Andras Simonovits and Jozsef Szucs (Hungary) 
• Jana Muizniece (Latvia) 
• Teodoras Medaiskis (Lithuania) 
• Maciej Zukowski (Poland) 
• Peter Golias (Slovak Republic) 
• Agneta Kruse (Sweden) 
• Matthias Zeeb (United Kingdom) 
 
The research team would like to express their gratitude for the guidance and inputs received 
from representatives of the European Commission, notably Mr Olivier Bontout and Mrs Kadi 
Toompere. The analysis has greatly benefited from the comments of the peer reviewer, Prof. 
Edward Palmer. We would also like to thank participants of the seminar “Private pension 
provision: Transition costs and decumulation phase” organized by the Social Protection 
Committee held in Tallinn on 6-7 September 2007. 
 
The core research team is solely responsible for any remaining errors, omissions or 
inaccuracies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRAXIS Center for Policy Studies, January 2008
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Abbreviations 
 
CEEC  Central and Eastern European Countries 
DB  Defined Benefit 
DC  Defined Contribution 
EU  European Union 
EUR  Euro (currency) 
FF  Fully Funded 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
NDC  Notional Defined Contribution 
OMC  Open Method of Coordination 
PAYG  Pay-As-You-Go 
SPC  Social Protection Committee 
UK  United Kingdom 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
The study focuses on transition costs associated with pension reforms and the implications of 
such reforms on pension adequacy in the EU Member States. It covers EU Member States which, 
over the last decade, have introduced multi-pillar pension systems with a funded pension scheme 
as part of their statutory pension system, namely: Hungary, Sweden, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia and Bulgaria. In addition, it also addresses the reforms planned in the UK.  
In 2001, the Laeken European Council European Union launched the open method of 
coordination (OMC) in the area of pensions ‘to help Member States progressively develop their 
own policies so as to safeguard the adequacy of pensions whilst maintaining their financial 
sustainability and facing the challenges of changing social needs’ (Council of the European 
Union 2001). The Council accordingly set 11 common objectives in light of these aspirations 
(see Annex 2). 
 
This study deals particularly with the following common pension objectives: 
• Objective 11 on the ability of pension systems to meet the challenges; 
• Objective 8 on ensuring adequate and financially sound private and public funded 
pensions; 
• Objective 6 on making pension systems sustainable in a context of sound public 
finances; and 
• Objective 10 on ensuring the principle of equal treatment between women and men in 
pension systems. 
 
In a joint report to the Stockholm European Council in 2001, the European Commission and the 
Council outlined a strategy to tackle the budgetary implications of ageing populations. 
According to the strategy, Member States should undertake ambitious reforms of pension 
systems in order to contain pressures on public finances, to place pension systems on a sound 
financial footing and to ensure a fair intergenerational balance. The strategy considered financial 
sustainability of pension systems as a necessary precondition for an adequate provision of 
pensions in the future. 
 
The Social Protection Committee (SPC), which was established in 2000 to serve as a vehicle for 
cooperative exchange between the European Commission and the EU Member States for the 
modernisation of social protection systems, has a mandate to work on the policy challenges 
related to, among others, making pensions safe and pension systems sustainable. Its Indicators 
Sub-Group has developed a set of indicators for monitoring countries' progress towards the 
realisation of the commonly agreed pension objectives.  
 
According to the streamlined OMC adopted by the European Council in March 2006, the 
overarching objectives for social protection and social inclusion are to promote adequate and 
sustainable pensions by ensuring (Commission of the European Communities 2006): 
(1) adequate retirement incomes for all and access to pensions which allow people to maintain, 
to a reasonable degree, their living standard after retirement, in the spirit of solidarity and 
fairness between and within generations; 
(2) the financial sustainability of public and private pension schemes, bearing in mind pressures 
on public finances and the ageing of populations, and in the context of the three-pronged strategy 
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for tackling the budgetary implications of ageing, notably by: supporting longer working lives 
and active ageing; by balancing contributions and benefits in an appropriate and socially fair 
manner; and by promoting the affordability and the security of funded and private schemes; 
(3) that pension systems are transparent, well adapted to the needs and aspirations of women and 
men and the requirements of modern societies, demographic ageing and structural change; that 
people receive the information they need to plan their retirement and that reforms are conducted 
on the basis of the broadest possible consensus.  
While the study focuses on one particular aspect of adaptation of pension systems – i.e., the issue 
of transition costs associated with pension reforms introducing funded defined contribution 
scheme – it shall be seen in the context of the streamlined OMC, addressing the aspects of 
adequacy, financial sustainability and modernisation of pension systems. 
According to the 2006 Synthesis Report on Adequate and Sustainable Pensions, future horizontal 
work in the framework of the OMC could, inter alia, focus on key issues in the development of 
private pensions, including efficient legal framework, inequality in coverage, security, 
information and transition costs (European Commission 2006). This study aims to make a 
contribution in respect of the latter issue, which is a crucial matter for states that have 
undertaken, or are planning to undertake, a partial shift in the financing principles of its pension 
system from pay-as-you-go to pre-funding. 
 
1.2. General approach, research questions and methodology  
In analyzing pension reforms that entail partial transition from PAYG to FF schemes, a 
distinction can be made between the impact of reforms at the macro level and the micro level.  
At the macro level, transition costs occur due to the re-allocation of one part of the former 
pension contribution of a pay-as-you-go scheme to individual accounts of insured persons in a 
funded scheme, as pensions for current beneficiaries have to be financed in a situation of reduced 
contribution revenues.  
Transition costs can be divided into (Leppik and Võrk 2006): 
• gross transition costs, expressed as the amount of pension contributions transferred to 
the funded scheme on behalf of persons who joined (either voluntarily or 
mandatorily) the scheme; 
• net transition costs, expressed as the difference between post-reform revenues and 
expenditures of the remaining PAYG pension scheme.  
 
The notion of gross transition costs indicates that the annual transition costs cannot be higher 
than the inflow of revenues to the newly established funded schemes. On the other hand, the 
actual, net transition costs are often lower than the total contributions diverted to the funded 
scheme due to the fact that governments use different methods to reduce the burden and that 
certain other factors may have the effect of limiting transition costs. 
The notions of gross and net transition costs are analytical categories that are not always easy to 
quantify because it is not always possible to segregate reform-induced costs from the ‘regular’ 
costs of the pension system, and it is not always clear what the counterfactual is. This difficulty 
in quantifying does not however render the analytical categories useless. In spite of some 
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practical measurement problems, it is evident that the difference between gross and net transition 
costs can be significant, which in turn may have significant effects on fiscal balance of the 
pension system and/or on access to, and adequacy of, benefits.  
Gross transition costs are influenced by the rate of pension insurance contribution diverted to the 
FF scheme, the total number of insured persons who joined the FF scheme (either voluntarily or 
were obliged), and the average earnings of the FF scheme participants. 
Direct government interventions to reduce actual transition costs have included the following 
methods: 
- shifting part of the cost to the current beneficiaries by containing the cost on PAYG 
pensions (e.g., by less favourable pension indexation rules); 
- restricting access to the pension system for future beneficiaries by increasing the 
statutory pension age and/or the average effective pension age (e.g., restricting access to 
early pension); 
- modifying principles of acquisition of pension rights and/or pension formula of the 
PAYG scheme for persons joining the multi-pillar system.  
In other words, some governments have transferred a part of the transition costs to current and/or 
future beneficiaries of the PAYG pension scheme (or to the micro level), with possible 
implications for the adequacy of current/future benefit. Moreover, even when the net transition 
costs are substantially lower than gross transition costs, the latter are sometimes perceived as 
opportunity costs (i.e., as costs which could have been potentially used for other purposes like 
increasing PAYG pensions at a higher rate to improve benefit adequacy). 
In addition to direct government intervention through policy measures, certain external factors 
have contributed to the reduction of net transition costs in some member states. For example, net 
transition costs are reduced if the reform has had a positive influence on tax contribution 
compliance (i.e., increasing post-reform revenues from pension insurance contributions). In this 
case, transition costs are partly shouldered by employees/employers formerly engaged in the 
grey economy. Importantly, high economic growth rates in recent years, which can be partly 
attributed to the positive impact of EU accession, have boosted employment in several new EU 
Member States. This has had positive influence on revenues of the PAYG pension scheme, 
easing the burden of transition costs. 
A ‘demographic window’ is another factor that has played a role in reducing the burden of 
transition cost. A demographic window of opportunity exists if the FF scheme is introduced at 
the time when the current and/or retiring cohorts of pensioners are small in relation to the cohorts 
entering the labour market (Palmer et al. 2006). Generally, the demographic developments in the 
CEECs have been quite favourable in this respect.  
Governments have used different alternatives to shoulder the remaining net transition costs. 
These include: 
• transfers from the state budget on account of other tax revenues (either increasing other 
taxes or reducing other public commitments);  
• use of revenues from privatizing state enterprises or other property;  
• use of reserves; and  
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• debt financing. 
In some cases, the PAYG pension scheme was already in deficit at the time of introduction of the 
reform. In some of the countries, transition to the FF scheme was undertaken with the underlying 
idea of containing costs of the compulsory pension system in the long run, while costs increased 
in the shorter time horizon. Therefore, an analysis of transition costs in these countries must take 
into account the pre-reform deficit of the pension system. At the same time, in other countries, 
the pre-reform pension system had reserves which have been used to shoulder transition costs. 
Apparently, different methods of shouldering transition costs shift the burden on different groups 
and cohorts. Hence, an analysis of methods used to finance transition costs sheds light on aspects 
of intra- and inter-generational solidarity associated with pension reforms. 
It must be noted that the reforms in different countries have different lengths of history, some of 
the reforms being introduced quite recently. Transition to the multi-pillar pension system was 
implemented in Hungary (1998), Sweden (1999), Poland (1999), Bulgaria (2000), Latvia (2001), 
Estonia (2002), Lithuania (2004) and Slovakia (2005). Therefore, in addition to a retrospective 
assessment of the methods of financing that have been used so far, the study gives also an 
overview of existing strategies for cushioning transition costs in the future, as such costs will be 
present for several coming decades.  
Introduction of FF schemes also entails other costs like system establishment costs, which are 
associated with the creation of necessary infrastructure for the operation of the FF scheme. These 
costs may include costs of establishing new structures (e.g., data registers, supervisory bodies) or 
costs of developing existing structures (e.g., acquisition of hardware, developing new or 
modifying existing software). Depending on the institutional set-up of the FF scheme in a 
particular Member State, some of these costs are borne by the state (i.e., financed from the state 
budget), while other costs by private institutions (e.g., pension fund management companies). 
The latter, in turn, may shift these costs to fund participants through pension fund management 
fees. Therefore, the fee structure of pension funds is also analyzed.  
The study also analyses the impact of reforms on pension adequacy, with reference to both 
reforms in the PAYG scheme and partial transition to the FF scheme. Firstly, the actual 
development of the average replacement rate after the reform (i.e., average net old age pension to 
average net wage). This indicates whether, and if yes, to what extent the reform has had negative 
impact on pension adequacy of the current pensioner population. Secondly, the impact of 
reforms on future pension adequacy is analyzed. For this purpose, theoretical replacement rates 
are calculated based on economic assumptions defined by the Indicators Sub-Group of the SPC 
in the framework of the OMC on pensions1. 
Theoretical replacement rates are calculated using both pre-reform and post-reform pension 
formula for the following persons: 
- average wage earner with a career of 40 years; 
- person earning 2/3 of average wage with a career of 40 years; 
- person earning 2/3 of average wage with a career of 30 years; 
                                                 
1  See Indicators Sub-Group of the Social Protection Committee (2006), “Current and prospective theoretical 
pension replacement rates” 19 May 2006. 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_protection/docs/isg_repl_rates_en.pdf. 
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- inactive person entitled only to the minimum pension. 
These persons broadly correspond to the categories of low earners, workers with a broken or 
short career (either due to raising children, unemployment or migration), and inactive persons. 
Impact of reforms on pension adequacy for these groups is analyzed using theoretical 
replacement rates, calculated both under pre-reform and post-reform pension formulas. Existing 
theoretical replacement rate calculations of the SPC were taken as the basis2, but additional 
calculations were made for the purpose of this study. 
In general, the FF schemes entail a strong link between contributions on earnings paid into the 
system and future benefits. In some countries, however, contributions are paid by the state or by 
other social insurance funds for certain periods outside active employment (e.g., state paying 
contributions during periods of childcare or unemployment). This signifies solidarity elements of 
the FF schemes, while maintaining the contribution-based feature of DC schemes. Another 
aspect of solidarity in some FF schemes examined in this study is the use of unisex life tables for 
benefit calculation entailing redistribution from men to women, given the fact that men have 
shorter life expectancy than women, a difference which is very significant in some Member 
States. 
The rate of return earned on contributions made to the scheme is another aspect that has 
significant impact on pension adequacy of the FF schemes. Calculations of the Social Protection 
Committee assume a real rate of return of 2.5% in the long run (ie., 3% of gross real rates of 
return minus 0.5% of administrative charges). This assumption can be considered rather 
conservative. At the same time, it is clear that there are significant national variations as to the 
actual net rates of return. In particular, this study analyzes the extent to which participants of FF 
schemes are exposed to investment risks and the kind of guarantees in place. 
Some Member States with newly established statutory funded schemes have left the choice of 
the level of investment risk to scheme participants, allowing a choice between pension funds 
with different investment strategies, and hence different risk levels (e.g., different exposure to 
equity risk).  
This study also analyzes age and gender composition of fund participants and the age and gender 
pattern of fund choices. Furthermore, it addresses whether any legal restrictions exist on fund 
choice and whether any neutral guidance or public education tools (e.g., Internet pages) are 
available to assist participants in making relevant choices.  
Core information on the topics and issues addressed in this study was collected from national 
experts using a questionnaire. Replies to the questionnaire were checked against other available 
sources of information such as national reports under the OMC, research articles, studies by the 
ILO, the World Bank and other sources. 
                                                 
2  In particular, the report on current and prospective theoretical pension replacement rates  
(http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_protection/docs/isg_repl_rates_en.pdf) 
and the study on minimum income provision for older people and their contribution to adequacy in 
retirement 
(http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_protection/docs/SPC%20Study%20minimum%20income%
20final.pdf). 
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2. Analysis of transition costs and their implications for 
pension adequacy 
 
Over the period 1998 – 2005, eight EU Member States have undertaken major pension reforms 
entailing a partial shift from a PAYG to a FF financing principle. These reforms were instituted 
for several considerations, among others: to strengthen individual responsibility towards 
retirement income, to cope with demographic pressures on PAYG schemes, to increase financial 
transparency, and to advance financial markets. While the emphasis, context and parameters of 
the reform vary from country to country, certain similarities and common patterns can be 
identified.  
Reforms entailing a shift from PAYG to FF scheme have been more widespread in Central and 
Eastern Europe. In fact, 6 out of 8 new Member States, which joined the EU in 2004, have 
undertaken such a reform, as did Bulgaria, which joined the EU in 2007. All of the Central and 
Eastern European countries examined here had already initiated the reform prior to joining the 
EU. 
 
2.1. Impacts of transition on fiscal balance of the pension system  
2.1.1. Pension expenditures and fiscal balance of the pension system 
Most of the Member States, which have introduced FF schemes as a part of their statutory 
pension systems, are spending on pensions less than the EU-25 average of 12.3% of GDP (Table 
2.1). Only Poland has been spending on pensions over the EU average. Sweden’s pension 
expenditures are close to the EU average, while Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia are in 
the group of countries with the lowest pension expenditures in the EU. 
 
Table 2.1. Expenditures on pensions as % of GDP 
Country  
(reform year) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Bulgaria (2000) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8.0p
Estonia (2002) .. .. .. .. .. 6.7 6.0 5.9 5.9 6.1 5.9 
Hungary (1998) .. .. .. .. 9.1 8.4 8.6 8.9 9.1 9.3 9.8 
Latvia (2001) .. .. 9.5 10.2 10.8 9.5 8.6 8.2 7.5 6.8 6.3p
Lithuania (2004) .. 6.7 6.7 7.3 8.2 7.9 7.3 7.0 6.8 6.7 6.6p
Poland (1999) .. .. .. .. .. 12.6 13.6 13.7 13.8 13.3 12.7p
Slovakia (2005) 7.2 7.1 7.2 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4p 7.6p
Sweden  (1999) 12.7 12.7 12.4 12.2 12.0 11.6 11.6 11.9 12.7 12.6 12.5p
United Kingdom 
(2012) 11.8 11.8 11.9 11.4 11.5 12.1 11.7 11.0 10.8 10.7p 11.0e
EU15 12.6 12.7 12.7 12.5 12.5 12.4 12.3 12.3 12.4 12.3 12.3e
EU25 .. .. .. .. .. 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.2 12.2e
EU27 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 12.2e
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Source: Eurostat database, ESSPROS data on social protection expenditures, table “Pensions”, sub-category “Total”, 
updated 14 Dec 2007; p – provisional values, e – estimated values. 
Note: Here and in the following tables the reform year refers to the year of introducing the fully funded (FF) 
scheme. Data for Sweden and United Kingdom also include occupational pensions. 
 
While a common economic argument posits that transition from a PAYG to a FF scheme does 
not add new costs to the pension system, but only shifts the timing when certain pension 
liabilities have to be financed (Holzmann 1998), it is clear that the change in financing principle 
does create practical fiscal problems for states undertaking such reforms. 
Governments have initiated transition to the multi-pillar system in quite different fiscal 
circumstances. Table 2.2 shows the development of fiscal balance of the PAYG pension scheme 
before and after the reform. 
Table 2.2. Current year surplus/deficit of the PAYG scheme as % of GDP before any 
financial transfers to the PAYG scheme 
Country  
(reform year) 
T-3 T-2 T-1 Reform 
year (T) 
T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+6 T+7 
Bulgaria (2000) .. -0.4 -0.9 -2.0 -2.0 -3.1 -2.6 -2.4 -2.3 -3.6 .. 
Estonia (2002) -0.9 -0.2 0.5 0.6 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 .. .. .. 
Hungary (1998) .. .. .. -0.5 -0.7 -0.7 -1.0 -1.8 -1.6 -2.0 -2.3 
Latvia (2001) -0.3 -0.9 -0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.9 1.3 .. .. 
Lithuania (2004) -0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 .. .. .. .. .. 
Poland (1999) -0.9 -1.3 -1.3 -2.0 -2.3 -2.9 -3.4 -3.4 -3.3 -3.0 -3.3 
Slovakia (2005) -0.4 -0.4 -1.1 -2.2 -2.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Sweden  (1999) .. .. .. .. 2.2 .. 2.0 .. 2.1 .. .. 
United Kingdom 
(2012) 
0.5 0.6 0.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Source: National reports (see Annex 4 for details of the sources of data in each Table) 
Notes: The reform year (T) takes into account the first effects of the reform. It must be noted that in Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania the FF scheme was introduced mid-year (from July). In other countries the reform was introduced 
from January of the respective year. United Kingdom – forecasts. 
 
In Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Latvia and Slovakia, the PAYG scheme was in current deficit 
prior to the introduction of reform (i.e., expenditures exceed contribution revenues in the given 
year). Diverting a part of the former PAYG contribution to the FF scheme increased the deficit in 
Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia. In Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia, the additional 
factor, which has increased the deficit of the PAYG scheme, is the decline of the PAYG 
contribution rate (see Table 2.5).  
In contrast, in the Baltic countries the pre-reform fiscal situation of the PAYG scheme was more 
favourable, as have been fiscal developments after the reform. In Estonia and Lithuania, the 
PAYG scheme was in surplus prior to initiating the reform. After the reform, the PAYG scheme 
in Estonia runs a small deficit around 0.2% of GDP. In Latvia and Lithuania, the PAYG scheme 
demonstrates an increasing surplus in spite of transition to the multi-pillar system.  
The relatively favourable fiscal situation of the PAYG pension schemes in the Baltic countries is 
explained by the fact that transition to the multi-pillar system coincided with a boost in economic 
growth (around 10% in recent years) with subsequent increase in employment rates which, in 
turn, has increased the revenues of the PAYG pension scheme. This has allowed all three Baltic 
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countries not only to cover the reform-induced deficit, but also to create reserves in the pension 
scheme, currently reaching nearly 3% of GDP in Estonia3 and 2% of GDP in Latvia and 
Lithuania (see Table 2.3). 
Among the countries studied here, pre-reform situation was most favourable in Sweden where 
there was a large reserve fund amounting to over 30% of GDP administered outside the state 
budget (Kruse and Palmer 2007). Sweden’s pre-reform pension scheme was financed by a 
combination of transfers from the state budget, contributions and withdrawals from the reserve 
fund. 
Table 2.3. End of year cumulative surplus/deficit of the PAYG scheme as % of GDP after 
all financial transfers 
Country  
(reform year) 
T-3 T-2 T-1 Reform 
year 
T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+6 T+7 
Bulgaria (2000) .. 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. 
Estonia (2002) 0.3 0.0 0.6 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.3 2.8 .. .. .. 
Hungary (1998) .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 
Latvia (2001) 0.2 -0.7 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -0.9 -0.1 0.8 1.9 .. .. 
Lithuania (2004) 0.0 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.9 .. .. .. .. .. 
Poland (1999) 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Slovakia (2005) 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Sweden  (1999) 32.3 32.2 31.9 29.2 32.6 24.3 20.1 22.9 24.6 28.1 29.6 
United Kingdom 
(2012) 
3.9 4.3 4.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Source: National reports   
Notes: Data for the United Kingdom are forecasts. 
Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia have had to make financial transfers from general state revenues 
amounting to 3% of GDP in order to reach financial equilibrium of the PAYG pension scheme 
(see Table 2.4). In Hungary, subsidies to the PAYG scheme have reached 2% of GDP, but this 
has not been sufficient to bring the PAYG scheme into financial balance, the residual deficit 
amounting to 0.4% of GDP in recent years (Table 2.3). In Estonia, additional transfers to the 
PAYG scheme have recently also amounted to 2% of GDP, but these transfers were made to 
increase the reserves of the PAYG scheme using the surplus of general tax revenues to create a 
financial buffer for financing transition costs in the coming years. 
Table 2.4. Total additional financial transfers to the PAYG scheme as % of GDP 
Country  
(reform year) 
T-3 T-2 T-1 Reform 
year 
T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+6 T+7 
Bulgaria (2000) .. 0.7 1.4 2.0 2.0 3.1 2.6 2.4 2.4 3.6 .. 
Estonia (2002) .. .. .. 0 0 0.4 0.3 1.9 .. .. .. 
Hungary (1998) .. .. .. 0.5 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.8 1.4 1.6 1.9 
Latvia (2001) 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .. .. 
Lithuania (2004) 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 .. .. .. .. .. 
Poland (1999) 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.6 2.2 2.9 2.9 3.3 3.0 3.4 
                                                 
3  In Estonia, a part of surplus of the general state budget on account of higher than expected tax revenues 
has been transferred to the PAYG pension reserve, which is invested by the State Treasury. 
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Slovakia (2005) .. 0.5 1.3 2.5 3.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Sweden  (1999) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
United Kingdom 
(2012) 
0 0 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Source: National reports 
Notes: United Kingdom – forecasts. Values in Tables 2.2 and 2.4 broadly make up values in Table 2.3, but the 
figures do not always add up exactly due to changes in GDP and rounding effects. 
 
2.1.2. Contributions and inflow of revenues to the funded scheme 
The inflow of revenues to the FF scheme is a function of three main factors:  
• the share of the total contribution rate diverted to the FF scheme;  
• the participation rate in the funded scheme; 
• the ratio of average earnings of FF scheme participants to the average earnings of insured 
persons in the PAYG scheme. 
In nominal terms, the highest contribution rates diverted from the former PAYG scheme to the 
FF scheme are in Slovakia (9%) and Hungary (8%). The lowest contribution rate for FF pensions 
is in Sweden (2.5 %) (Table 2.5). 
Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania opted for a gradual increase in the contribution rate for the FF 
scheme to ease transition costs in the first post-reform years. Latvia started with the lowest 
contribution rate for the FF scheme at 2%, but adopted legislation aims to increase contribution 
rate to 10% by 2010. Lithuania has increased the contribution rate for the FF scheme from 2.5% 
to 5.5% over the period 2004-2007.  
In relative terms, the share of the former PAYG pension contribution diverted to the FF scheme 
is slightly over 30% in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia; about 20% in Latvia, Estonia and 
Lithuania; and less than 20% in Bulgaria and Sweden. However, if the increase in the 
contribution rate for the FF scheme in Latvia will be implemented, the share of the FF scheme 
contribution will increase to 50% of the total statutory pension contribution.  
Table 2.5. Contribution rates to the PAYG and FF schemes for switchers and non-
switchers (%) 
Country  
(reform year) 
 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+6 
Bulgaria (2000) Switchers PAYG   32 29 27 27 26 26 19 
 Switchers FF   0 0 2 2 3 3 4 
 Non-switchers 37 35.7 32 29 29 29 29 29 23 
Estonia (2002) Switchers PAYG   16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
 Switchers FF   4+2 4+2 4+2 4+2 4+2 4+2 4+2 
 Non-switchers 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20  
Hungary (1998) Switchers PAYG     25.0 25.0 25.0 23.0 21.0 19.5 18.5 
 Switchers FF   6 6 6 6 6 8 8 
 Non-switchers 31.0 31.0 31.0 31.0 31.0 28.0 26.0 26.5 26.5 
Latvia (2001) Switchers PAYG   18 18 18 18 18 18 16 
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 Switchers FF   2 2 2 2 2 2 4 
 Non-switchers 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Lithuania  Switchers PAYG 25 25.9 23.4 22.5 21.6 20.7    
(2004) Switchers FF   2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5    
 Non-switchers 25 25.9 25.9 26 26.1 26.2    
Poland (1999) Switchers PAYG   12.22 12.22 12.22 12.22 12.22 12.22 12.22 
 Switchers FF   7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 
 Non-switchers 33 33 19.52 19.52 19.52 19.52 19.52 19.52 19.52 
Slovakia (2005) Switchers PAYG   15 15      
 Switchers FF   9 9      
 Non-switchers 28 26 24 24      
Sweden (1999) PAYG   16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 
 Switchers FF   2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
 Before reform  18.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
United  Switchers PAYG          
Kingdom Switchers FF          
(2012) Non-switchers 19.85 19.85        
Source: National reports 
Notes: The Polish pre-reform contribution rate covers also other social security benefits. In Latvia, the legislation 
prescribes a gradual increase of the FF contribution rate to 10% by 2010. UK – theoretical contribution rate 
equivalent to the share of pensions in total national insurance contribution. It is intended that from the year of the 
introduction of the FF scheme, employees will contribute 4%. Employer contribution rates will grow from 1% in the 
first year to an eventual 3%. An additional 1% contribution will come from tax relief. 
 
Estonia has been the only Member State to increase the total contribution rate while introducing 
the FF scheme. It requires persons who join the FF schem to pay an additional individual 
contribution of 2% of gross wage. Contribution rate for non-switchers remains at the pre-reform 
level. In a similar way, the planned voluntary but auto-enrolment FF scheme for the UK will 
receive an additional total contribution of 7% from employees and employers. 
Bulgaria and Poland reduced the overall contribution rate prior to, or at the time of, introducing 
the FF scheme. Bulgaria continued to reduce PAYG contribution rate after the introduction of 
the FF scheme, as has been the case in Hungary.  
In essence, Hungary and Bulgaria have simultaneously instituted two major reforms in the field 
of pension finances: a partial transition to the FF scheme and a shift from contribution financing 
towards more general revenue financing of the remaining PAYG scheme. In fact, as long as 
liabilities of the pension scheme remain the same, reduction of the contribution rate of the PAYG 
scheme has similar effects as the partial transition to the FF scheme since both reforms create the 
need for additional financing.   
The highest annual inflows of revenues to the FF scheme are observed in Poland, exceeding 
1.4% of GDP. In Hungary, Estonia and Slovakia funded schemes also accumulate over 1% of 
GDP a year and in Sweden close to 1%. 
Table 2.6. Inflow of revenues to the FF scheme as % GDP 
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Country  
(reform year) 
Reform 
year 
T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+6 T+7 
Bulgaria (2000) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 .. 
Estonia (2002) 0.1 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.1 .. .. .. 
Hungary (1998) 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.2 
Latvia (2001) 0.1  0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 .. .. 
Lithuania (2004) 0.3 0.4 0.7 .. .. .. .. .. 
Poland (1999) 0.3 0.6 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4 
Slovakia (2005) 0.6 1.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Sweden (1999) 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 
United Kingdom 
(2012) 
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 .. .. .. 
Source: National reports 
Notes: UK – forecasts. In Estonia, inflow of revenues to the FF scheme is higher than gross transition costs because, 
besides the share of the former PAYG contribution which was diverted to the FF scheme (4%), there is also a 
supplementary individual contribution of 2% for the FF scheme.  
A comparison of the data in Table 2.6 with that in Tables 2.2 and 2.4 shows that, in some 
countries, the annual deficit of the PAYG scheme and the additional transfers to bring the PAYG 
scheme into balance are higher than the inflow of contribution revenues to the FF scheme, 
indicating that contributions are not sufficient to cover PAYG commitments even in the absence 
of the FF scheme. This is the situation in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.  
This is partly explained by the fact that the PAYG scheme in these countries was in deficit at the 
time of introducing the FF scheme and these imbalances have not only persisted, but also further 
increased after the reform. In the cases of Bulgaria and Hungary, another factor is the decline of 
the contribution rate, i.e., the shift in financing from contributions to general tax revenues. In 
Slovakia, the decline of the PAYG contribution rate reflects the introduction of a special reserve 
fund in the Social Insurance Agency. Hence, gross transition costs related to transition from the 
PAYG to the FF scheme only partly explain the increase of the annual deficit of the remaining 
PAYG schemes in these countries. 
It can also be observed that net annual transition costs in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been 
significantly below the inflow of revenues to the FF scheme (or gross annual transition costs). 
Moreover, all three Baltic states have accumulated increasing reserves even though a part of the 
former PAYG contribution to the FF scheme has been redirected (see Table 2.3). This was made 
possible due to high economic growth, resulting in increased employment and real wages and 
improved tax compliance.4
2.1.3. Policies and behaviour of joining the FF pension scheme 
Transition costs are influenced, but at the same time can be controlled, by policies on which 
cohorts are obliged to join the new FF scheme, which cohorts are provided the option of joining, 
and which groups are prohibited from joining (see Palacios and Whitehouse 1998). These 
                                                 
4  As has been noted earlier, reserves in Estonia have been created on account of a surplus of general tax 
revenues, and not from PAYG scheme revenues. 
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policies and, more importantly, the actual response to such policies (i.e., the behaviour of 
workers permitted to join the FF scheme) shape the path of development of transition costs.  
The wide choice for joining the FF scheme combined with the high rate of joining place a 
relatively heavy burden of transition costs on the first decades of the reform. Subsequently, the 
size of annual transition costs gradually decreases.5 At the same time, a relatively low cut-off age 
(i.e., the age at which joining the FF scheme is not allowed) would restrict transition costs during 
the initial years after reform. The costs would however gradually increase, reaching a maximum 
a couple of decades after the reform, and thereafter start to decline (Palacios and Whitehouse 
1998).  
Hungary, Lithuania, Estonia and Slovakia allowed the broadest choice, permitting all employed 
persons to join the FF scheme (Table 2.7). Bulgaria adopted the most restrictive policy, setting 
the cut-off age at 40. Poland and Latvia opted for a middle way, allowing choice for persons 
aged 30-50 and imposing mandatory participation on persons under 30 at the time of the reform 
and restricting access to all over 50. 
Obviously, when designing policies in respect of joining the FF scheme, states had also other 
considerations than only restricting transition costs. First and foremost, most countries either 
restricted or discouraged older workers to join the FF scheme because the shorter time period of 
pension accumulation implies smaller additional benefit from joining, if any.   
Table 2.7. Policies in respect of possibilities to join the FF scheme 
Country  
(reform year) 
Obligatory Optional Not allowed 
Bulgaria (2000) 
Aged under 40  
at the time of the reform 
(born 1.1.1960 or later) 
None Aged 40 or over 
at the time of the reform 
(born 1959 or earlier) 
Estonia (2002) 
Aged under 19  
at the time of the reform 
(born 1.1.1983 or later) 
Aged 19-60 
at the time of the reform 
(born 1942-1982)  
Aged over 60 
(born 1941 or earlier) 
 
Hungary (1998) Entering labour market 1.1.1998 or later 
All employed 
at the time of the reform 
Retired persons 
Latvia (2001) 
Aged under 30  
at the time of the reform 
(born 1.7.1971 or later) 
Aged 30-49  
at the time of the reform 
(born 2.71951-1.7.1971) 
Aged 50 or over  
at the time of the reform 
(born 1.7.1951 or earlier) 
Lithuania (2004) 
None All persons  
insured for full social 
insurance pension 
Persons above pension 
age 
Poland (1999) 
Aged under 30  
at the time of the reform  
(born 1.1.1969 or later) 
Aged 30-50  
at the time of the reform 
(born 1.1.1949-31.12.1968) 
Aged over 50 
at the time of the reform 
(born 1948 or earlier) 
Slovakia (2005) 
Entering social insurance 
scheme 2005 and later 
Persons who had entered 
social insurance scheme 
before 2005 
None 
Sweden  (1999) 
Aged under 62 
at the time of the reform 
(born 1938 or later) 
None Aged 62 or over 
at the time of the reform 
(born 1937 or earlier) 
                                                 
5  Obviously, the yearly transition costs also decrease as the obligations to pensioners under the old rules 
decline. Furthermore, demographic factors like the cohort size may significantly influence the pattern of 
development of annual transition costs. 
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United Kingdom 
(2012) 
All employees will be 
automatically enrolled, unless 
already participating in an 
appropriate scheme provided 
by their employer, but can opt 
out. Persons changing 
employer or having been opted 
out for three years will be 
automatically re-enrolled. 
The self-employed as well 
as those not in paid work 
can voluntarily opt in.  
 
Notes: Bulgaria – certain hazardous categories of workers (classified as I and II labour category) are subject to 
mandatory insurance in a professional pension fund regardless of their age.  
Lithuania – farmers and self-employed who are not insured for the full social insurance pensions cannot join the FF 
scheme.  Slovakia – with effect from 2008, the obligation to join was cancelled. 
Instead of restricting access to the FF scheme, older persons in Slovakia were discouraged to join 
through a policy that sets a threshold of at least 10 years of saving before a pension can be taken 
from the FF scheme.  
Similarly, in Estonia, were the cut-off age was close to the pension age, older workers were 
discouraged from joining since benefits from the FF scheme are available only from 2009 (i.e., 
required at least 6.5 years of affiliation). Moreover, older cohorts had a considerably shorter time 
window for joining (having to make a decision within a period of 7 months), while for the 
younger cohorts window for joining is still open (Table 2.8). 
Table 2.8. Time window for joining to the FF scheme for cohorts whose participation was 
optional 
Country  
(reform year) 
Time window for joining 
Estonia (2002) 
Different cohorts have had a different time window to make the decision,  
varying from 7 months to 8.5 years:  
born 1942-1951:  1.4.2002-31.10.2002   
born 1957-1961:  until 31.10.2003   
born 1962-1964:  until 31.10.2004   
born 1965-1967:  until 31.10.2005   
born 1968-1970:  until 31.10.2006   
born 1971-1973:  until 31.10.2007   
born 1974-1976:  until 31.10.2008   
born 1977-1979:  until 31.10.2009   
born 1980-1982:  until 31.10.2010    
Hungary (1998) 20 months (1 January 1998 – 31 August 1999) 
Latvia (2001) no time limit 
Lithuania (2004) no time limit 
Poland (1999) 12 months (1 January 1999 - 31 December 1999) 
Slovakia (2005) 18 months (1 January 2005 - 30 June 2006) 
Notes: In 2007, the Parliament of Slovakia approved another option during the period January 2008 - June 2008, 
when people will have the possibility to move in both ways, to join the FF scheme pillar or to switch back to the 
PAYG. According to the Slovak Government, joining of the FF scheme is beneficial only persons earning at least 
SKK 29.000 (€862) on a condition that they are saving for at least 25-30 years. Therefore, the Government decided 
to give people an opportunity to re-evaluate their original decision, which was often made under the influence of 
advertising. In January 2008, about 4900 persons who had joined the FF scheme switched back to the PAYG 
scheme. 
Table 2.9 illustrates the participation rate in the FF scheme using as the proxy indicator the ratio 
of participants of the FF scheme to the total number of insured persons (actual contributors) to 
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the PAYG scheme. This proxy indicator overestimates the active participation rate as FF scheme 
participants include ‘non-active participants’ i.e., persons who have joined the FF scheme but do 
not make contributions to the scheme in a given year. 
Table 2.9. Share of participants of the FF scheme as a proportion of contributors to the 
PAYG scheme (%) 
Country  
(reform year) 
Reform 
year  
T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+6 T+7 
Bulgaria (2000) .. .. .. 76 86 91 92 .. 
Estonia (2002) 6 35 59 71 75 .. .. .. 
Hungary (1998) 35 55 57 58 57 59 62 64 
Latvia (2001) 27 33 47 58 68 77 .. .. 
Lithuania (2004) 36 44 53 .. .. .. .. .. 
Poland (1999) 78 80 83 86 90 93 89 93 
Slovakia (2005) 43 60 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Sweden (1999) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: National reports 
Notes: Estonia – FF scheme participants to employed 15-69. Lithuania – FF scheme participants to contributors for 
full PAYG social insurance pension. Bulgaria – National Social Security Institute (NSSI) estimates that the share of 
active FF scheme participants to PAYG contributors is about 80%. Latvia – the share of active FF scheme 
participants to active PAYG contributors in 2006 was 67%. In Hungary, the participation rate in 2002 slightly 
declined as the Government allowed switching back to the PAYG in consideration of ‘overswitching’ by persons for 
whom joining the FF scheme was not a rational decision. 
 
The participation rate is apparently influenced by rules on which cohorts were obliged to join the 
new system, on which cohorts were provided the option of joining, and on which groups were 
prohibited from joining the funded scheme.  
Apart from Sweden, where it was mandatory to join the new system (albeit with only partial 
contributions going to the FF scheme for persons born before 1954), the highest participation 
rates in the FF schemes are observed in Poland and Bulgaria (over 90% of the employed), 
followed by Latvia and Estonia (about 75%). The lowest participation rate is currently observed 
in Lithuania, exceeding 50%.  However, it must be considered that the Lithuanian reform has a 
shorter history and that joining the FF scheme (partially opting out from the state pension 
insurance) has been voluntary for all workers. In Hungary and Slovakia, participation rates are 
around 60-70%. 
In addition, the development of participation rate over the post-reform period is influenced by 
the time window for joining the FF scheme (Table 2.8). In Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, where 
the open season for joining was limited, the participation rate increases further only on account 
of compulsory participants (young cohorts entering the labour market). In Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania where the option to join the FF scheme is still open (in Estonia only for younger 
cohorts), participation rate also increases due to some additional voluntary participants. 
Table 2.10 compares participation rates in Estonia and Lithuania using another indicator – the 
ratio of FF scheme participants to the total number of persons in age cohorts who were eligible to 
join the FF scheme.  In both countries, joining the FF scheme has been most active in age group 
25-44 and lowest in age group 55-64. 
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Table 2.10. Ratio of FF scheme participants to the total potential participants: Estonia, 
Lithuania (%) 
 Estonia  Lithuania 
Men 58 37 
Women 54 39 
15-24 65 23 
25-34 73 61 
35-44 73 53 
45-54 45 39 
55-64 17 8 
Source: National reports 
Notes: Data from 2006. Estonia – the two lower age cohorts in the table are 15-23 and 24-34. 
Data from Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia indicate that the high-wage earners were among the 
first to join the FF scheme (Table 2.11). However, as the window for joining the FF scheme 
closes and the share of compulsory participants (new entrants to the labour market with lower 
wage levels) increases, the ratio of average earnings of FF scheme participants comes closer to 
the average earnings of persons insured in the PAYG scheme. In Latvia and Bulgaria, the ratio is 
below 100% because of a cohort effect: participation in the FF scheme was mandatory for 
younger cohorts with lower earnings. 
Table 2.11. Ratio of average earnings of FF scheme participants to the average earnings of 
persons insured in the PAYG scheme (%) 
Country  
(reform year) 
Reform 
year  
T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 
Bulgaria (2000) .. .. 91 92 96 97 
Estonia (2002) .. 113 118 116 106 .. 
Latvia (2001) 29 72 67 81 82 80 
Lithuania (2004) 124 113 105 .. .. .. 
Slovakia (2005) 107 109 .. .. .. .. 
Source: National reports 
Notes: Estonia – only FF scheme participants with positive earnings were considered; earnings of insured persons in 
the PAYG scheme include imputed income based on social tax paid by the state. Lithuania – the ratio of the average 
wage of FF scheme participants to the average wage of contributors insured for full PAYG social insurance pension. 
Hungary and Poland – comparable data was not available. Sweden is not included in the table as participation was 
compulsory for all. 
2.1.4. Reforms of PAYG scheme with impacts on transition costs 
Parallel to the introduction of the FF schemes, most of the states in this study have undertaken 
various reforms of their remaining PAYG schemes. Most reforms have to do with switching to a 
more conservative indexation, increasing the statutory pension age, reducing the options for 
earlier retirement, and changing the PAYG pension formula (Table 2.12). While these policy 
measures were normally not taken with the explicit aim of reducing transition costs, but rather 
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with the more general goal of improving the financial sustainability of the PAYG scheme, it is 
clear that such measures may potentially have a very significant long-term impact on the 
development of transition costs.  
Furthermore, a switch towards less favourable indexation rules transfers a part of the gross 
transition costs respectively to current or future beneficiaries and may have significant 
implications for pension adequacy. 
Table 2.12. Impact of reforms of the PAYG scheme on transition costs 
Country 
Measure  
↓  reduces costs 
↑ increases costs 
0  no measures taken B
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Changing indexation ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 0 ↓ 0 ↑ ↑ 
Increasing statutory 
pension age 
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
(plan) 
↓ 0 ↓ 
Reducing early 
retirement options 
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 0 ↓ ↓  
(from 
2008) 
↓ ↓ 
Changing PAYG 
pension formula 
↓ ↑ 0 ↓ 0 ↓ 0 ↓ ↑ 
Source: National reports 
Notes: In Latvia, legislated changes will make indexation more favourable starting 2010. 
More conservative indexation rules were adopted in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary and Poland. 
Nevertheless, in most cases, this has not (yet) influenced the actual replacement rates of current 
PAYG pensions (see below). In Sweden, the reform package included a shift towards a more 
generous indexation of pensions, while the rules for acquiring pension rights were tightened. The 
planned reform in the UK moves in the same direction. 
In Estonia, automatic indexation of pensions was introduced only in 2002 parallel to the 
introduction of the FF scheme. Pensions were previously increased only by ad hoc decisions, 
depending on revenues of the PAYG scheme. However, such method of increasing pensions 
could not be maintained in a situation of reduced contribution rate for the PAYG scheme. At the 
same time, the indexation rules enacted in 2002 were quite conservative (arithmetic average of 
the consumer price index and social tax revenues index) which, under circumstances of high real 
wage growth, resulted in surplus of revenues and allowed ad hoc increases. 
The statutory minimum pension age has been, or is being, increased in Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia; while Poland is planning to increase it (Tables 2.12 
and 2.13). Latvia, Hungary and Slovakia aim at equalising the pension age of men and women at 
62 years of age. In all three countries, the target pension age for men has already been reached; 
the target age for women will be reached in Latvia and Hungary in 2008, and in Slovakia in 
2014. In Estonia, the target age is 63, which is to be reached for women in 2016. In the UK, the 
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target age is 65, but the gradual equalisation of pension age of women will take place over the 
period 2010-2020. The eventual target age (legislated for in 2007) is 68 in 2046. In Bulgaria and 
Lithuania, gender-specific pension ages are maintained and women are entitled to pension at a 
lower age, although the age gap between men and women has been narrowed. In Sweden, where 
the pre-reform pension system included a full-benefit pension age of 65 years, but a minimum 
pension age of 60, the reform increased the minimum age to 61 and legislated the right to work 
up to 67. Prior to the reform, union-management agreements set a de facto pension age at 65. 
Reform in Sweden has introduced flexible retirement based on life expectancy at the time of 
retirement. 
Table 2.13. Changes in statutory pension age 
Country 
(reform 
year) 
 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+6 T+7 Target 
(year) 
Bulgaria M 60 60 60.5 61 61.5 62 62.5 63 63 63 .. 
(2000) F 55 55 55.5 56 56.5 57 57.5 58 58.5 59 60 (2009) 
Estonia M 62.5 63 63 63 63 63 63 .. .. .. .. 
(2002) F 57.5 58 58.5 58.5 59 59.5 59.5 .. .. .. 63 (2016) 
Hungary M 60.0 61.0 61.0 62.0 62.0 62.0 62.0 62.0 62.0 62.0 .. 
(1998) F 56.0 56.0 57.0 57.0 58.0 58.0 59.0 59.0 60.0 60.0 62 (2008) 
Latvia M 60 60.5 61 61.5 62 62 62 62 .. .. .. 
(2001) F 57.5 58 58.5 59 59.5 60 60.5 61 .. .. 62 (2008) 
Lithuania M 60.83 61 61.5 62 62.5 62.5 62.5 62.5 62.5 .. .. 
(2004) F 56.67 57 57.5 58 58.5 59 59.5 60 60 .. .. 
Poland M 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 .. 
(1999) F 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 .. 
Slovakia M 60 60.75 61.5 62 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
(2005) F 57 57.75 58.5 59.25 .. .. .. .. .. .. 62 (2014) 
Sweden M 65 65 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
(1999) F 65 65 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
United  M 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 .. .. .. .. 
Kingdom 
(2012) 
F 60 60.5 61 61.5 62 62.5 63 .. .. .. 65 (2020) 
Source: National reports 
Notes: Slovakia – pension age for women with no children. Hungary – in 2006 the pension age of women was 
already 61. Sweden – the reform abolished a statutory pension age; however, pensions can be paid from the age of 
61, while the guarantee pension is not paid before the age of 65. 
Table 2.13 also indicates that, as a rule, increases in the pension age were initiated before 
launching the FF scheme, except in Bulgaria, where these two measures were taken 
simultaneously. Therefore, in most of the cases, it cannot be claimed that the increase of pension 
age was undertaken with an explicit agenda to shoulder transition costs. Rather, both measures 
were undertaken with the similar aim of improving sustainability of the pension system.  
Moreover, all countries studied here have also taken steps to reduce early retirement options, 
including phasing out of special rights granted during the socialist period. Increase of pension 
age effectively reduces the burden of transition costs, in particular as the speed of increasing 
pension age exceeds improvements in life expectancy (as has been the case in the countries 
analysed here) and as the employment rate of older workers (55-64 age group) has increased 
(observed in all countries analysed here, except Poland). 
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Latvia, Poland and Sweden changed their PAYG pension formulas by introducing NDC schemes 
that contain the costs of the PAYG scheme compared to the earlier DB arrangement. Transitional 
rules in Latvia (i.e., awarding of initial capital to the notional accounts of workers) had an 
additional cost containment effect. In Poland and Sweden, the NDC formula is the same for 
those who joined the FF scheme and those who did not, but due to lower contributions to the 
PAYG scheme the rights acquired from the NDC scheme are proportionally lower for FF scheme 
participants6. However, NDC designs in these countries differ with respect to indexation of 
pensions. 
In Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania, the PAYG pension formula is also the same for all, although 
the DB system has been retained. In Estonia and Lithuania, joining the FF scheme influences 
only the contribution-related ‘insurance’ component of the PAYG pension, but it does not affect 
the flat-rate base amount of the PAYG pension.7 This gives an incentive to join the FF scheme, 
but, at the same time, it entails additional transition costs since pension rights in the PAYG 
scheme are not reduced in the same proportion as contributions are reduced. 
2.1.5. Means and strategies to shoulder transition costs 
While governments have taken various steps to control transition costs, the long-term outlook on 
methods to finance the remaining net transition costs is still unclear in most of the countries 
studied here.  
Experts from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia claim that no long-term strategy on 
financing transition costs exist in their respective countries. Hungary and Bulgaria have adopted 
relevant strategy papers, but experts question their practicability. Nonetheless, most governments 
have at least outlined some short-term measures for covering transition costs. 
In Bulgaria, the National Pension Reform Strategy adopted by the Parliament in 1999 prescribes 
the use of budget transfers (subsidies) from other tax revenues to cover the deficit of the public 
pension scheme. The strategy paper envisaged that the deficit should last only until 2010. 
However, subsequent policy decisions (specifically, the decision to reduce contribution rate) 
imply that the deficit will last even until 2050. 
In Estonia, during the early post-reform years, transition costs have been financed from two 
sources: surplus of social tax revenues from previous periods and transfers from general taxes. 
The Government Budget Strategy until 2011 indicates that the same sources will be used in the 
medium term. In 1997, a stabilisation reserve was established from state budget surpluses and 
revenues of privatisation which, according to the legislation, may be used to cover expenditures 
related to major structural reforms, including pension reform. However, the stabilisation reserve 
has not yet been used to finance transition costs. The 2000 Government Budget Strategy also 
indicated that additional loans may be taken to cover the deficit of the pension reform; however, 
no loans have so far been taken to cover transition costs. 
                                                 
6 In Latvia, it is possible to switch back from the FF scheme to the PAYG scheme at eth etime of retirement, by 
transferring the accumulated capital from the FF scheme to the NDC scheme and withdraw the total benefit from the 
NDC scheme. 
7  The flat-rate base amount currently constitutes about 35% of the average old age pension. In 2007, 
legislation has been adopted to gradually increase the relative share of the base amount. 
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In Slovakia, in 2005-2006, the reserve fund and surpluses from other funds of the Social 
Insurance Agency and privatisation revenues have been used to cover transition costs. The 
government has deposited part of the revenues from privatisation of the national gas plant and 
the national electricity plant (i.e., more than EUR 2 billion including interests) to finance 
transition costs. These revenues are supposed to cover transition costs until 2009, but, 
apparently, a plan on how to proceed thereafter is missing. 
In Lithuania, there is an informal agreement that 50% of income lost by the PAYG pension 
scheme will be covered by the stabilisation reserve fund annually. While the principle is not 
legally binding, it has been respected thus far in appropriating annual budgets. 
In Poland, a Demographic Reserve Fund of the PAYG NDC scheme was established in 2002 and 
0.1 percentage point of the 19.52% NDC contribution was earmarked for this buffer fund. The 
contribution rate allocated for the Demographic Reserve Fund was increased to 0.14% in 2004 
and to 0.2% in 2005. However, according to the current legislation, contributions to the Fund 
will be paid only until the end of 2008.  
The Swedish system includes a buffer fund and an automatic balancing mechanism which 
ensures that long-run PAYG expenditures cannot exceed revenues.8 Therefore, the Swedish 
reform has not induced any direct transition costs as any imbalances are cushioned within the 
PAYG system. Whenever assets (contribution assets plus the buffer fund) fall below liabilities 
(balancing ratio less than 1), the balancing mechanism is activated by lowering the accrual rate 
in the PAYG notional accounts and by lowering outgoing benefits. For the time being, this 
remains a hypothetical scenario since assets have exceeded liabilities of the system in the post-
reform years. 
In Latvia, the government has projections on the evolution of transition costs, but no former 
strategy paper for financing transition costs has been adopted. The plan to increase the FF 
contribution rate from the current 4% to 10% by 2010 will obviously influence the evolution of 
transition costs. In their analysis of the projected development of transition costs in Latvia, 
Palmer et al. (2006) argue that the increase of the FF contribution rate to 10% cannot be 
realistically achieved because this would lead to major trade-offs with pension indexation for 
pensioners. They suggest stopping the increase of the FF contribution rate at 7% or 8%. 
Similarly, Vanovska (2006) suggests not increasing the FF contribution rate in Latvia beyond 
8%. 
One of the still understudied aspects, which may have some impact towards reducing transition 
costs, is the effect of the reform on contribution compliance (see also Fultz and Stanovnik 2004). 
Funded schemes entail a strong contribution-benefit link and sums accumulated on individual 
accounts are regarded as private assets. From this perspective, transition from a PAYG scheme 
to a FF scheme strengthens incentives to contribute to the pension system, and, presumably, 
leads to better contribution compliance. It is, however, difficult to establish whether this 
presumption has materialised, or if there has been an impact at all. As such, reforms have 
coincided with the rather favourable economic developments in most of the Central and Eastern 
European countries; contribution revenues have also increased due to increasing employment 
and wage levels. There have been no specific studies carried out to segregate the effect of 
reforms on contribution compliance from other factors at play (e.g., legalisation of employment 
                                                 
8  Five so-called National Pension Plans (AP funds) administer the capital of the buffer fund. 
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and wages) in the countries concerned. However, based on revenue statistics, officials and 
experts in Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia have claimed that the reform has probably improved 
contribution compliance. 
2.1.6. System establishment costs 
Besides transition costs, which have a long-term nature, introduction of FF schemes also entails 
short-term system establishment costs, including:  
• costs associated with the preparation and enactment of the necessary legislation; 
• costs associated with the set up or upgrade of the necessary infrastructure for the 
operation of the FF scheme, including costs of establishing new structures (e.g., data 
registers, supervisory bodies) or costs of developing existing structures (e.g., acquisition 
of hardware, developing new or modifying existing software); and 
• costs associated with public education campaigns and marketing. 
The expected benefits of these costs include an improved financial education of the population 
and advanced institutional arrangements. 
Some of the system establishment costs are been borne by the state (financed from the state 
budget), while private institutions (e.g. pension fund management companies) bear the other 
costs. Systematic information on system establishment costs is not always available, but the 
following provide examples of such costs in the countries studied. 
In Estonia, one-off costs associated with the introduction of the reform in 2002 included costs for 
a public education campaign financed by the state in the amount of EEK 3 million (EUR 
190.000), EEK 4 million (EUR 255.000) for upgrading the IT system of the Tax Board to 
administer the additional contribution for the FF scheme, and EEK 1.5 million (EUR 96.000) for 
additional personnel costs of the Tax Board. The state also made a lump-sum transfer to the 
registrar of pension fund units (Estonian Central Depository of Securities) in the amount of EEK 
3 million (EUR 190.000) to cover the costs related to setting up the registry. Pension fund 
management companies, through registrars’ fee, cover the annual administrative costs of the 
registrar. Administrative costs of the registrar amounted to EEK 5.5 million (EUR 350.000) in 
2006. 
In Latvia, the public education campaign cost the state LVL 115.000 (EUR 67.000). Another 
LVL 112.000 (EUR 65.000) were spent for the preparation of relevant legislation and LVL 
50.000 (EUR 29.000) on additional staff and training costs. Part of costs related to introduction 
of the pension reform (service of advisers, public information, etc.) was financed by the World 
Bank loan and grants (Welfare Reform Project and Social Insurance Reform Project).9
                                                 
9 The Welfare Reform Project Loan amounted to 9 million EUR, grant funds provided by the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) 46 million SEK and the Japanese grant 0,1 million USD for 
Programmatic Structural Adjustment Loan , but these funds covered also other activities in addition to pension 
reform. 
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In Lithuania, reform-related costs included LTL 2.3 million (EUR 667.000) for updating the IT 
system of the Social Insurance Institution in 2003 (a year before the reform), LTL 750 thousand 
(EUR 217.000) for two public information campaigns in 2003 and 2006-2007, and LTL 216 
thousand (EUR 63.000) for additional staff costs. Marketing costs of private pension funds and 
costs of fund sales agents were about LTL 9 million (EUR 2.6 million) in 2003. 
In Poland, major costs relate to ZUS (Social Insurance Institution) which has to pay interest to 
private pension funds for overdue contribution (due to failures of administration and information 
systems) as well as to banks for credits incurred. These costs totalled PLN 3.1 billion (EUR 800 
million) over 1999-2002 and PLN 1.1 billion (EUR 300 million) over 2003-2006. The costs of 
renewing the IT system amounted to PLN 1.1 billion (EUR 300 million) in 1999-2002. Public 
information campaign by the government amounted to PLN 18 million (EUR 4.5 million) in 
1999. Acquisition and marketing costs of private pension funds were estimated to total PLN 1.6 
billion (EUR 370 million) in 1999. Marketing expenditures were identified as the main factor 
contributing to financial losses of pension funds in 1999 and 2000 (Chłon-Dominczak 2002; 
Fultz 2002). 
In Slovakia, the most significant have been the IT costs for the Social Insurance Agency (SIA) 
amounting to SKK 163 million (EUR 4.4 million) over 2003-2007, supplemented by SKK 104 
million (EUR 2.8 million) for the SIA staff training and SKK 5 million (EUR 135.000) for SIA’s 
overhead costs. Reform-related costs to the public sector also included about SKK 50 million 
(EUR 1.3 million) for public information campaign and SKK 13 million (EUR 0.4 million) for 
legal costs on external experts to prepare the legislation for the FF scheme. 
In Hungary, marketing costs of private pension funds in the first year of the reform were 
estimated to amount to HUF 4-5 billion (EUR 18-22 million). 
In Sweden, the renewal of the IT system cost SEK 151 million (EUR 17 million) in 1999. Private 
fund providers also devoted considerable sums of money to general advertising to attract initial 
choosers. 
In the UK, where the reform is still in planning phase, one-off gross implementation costs to 
employers are estimated to reach GBP 225 million (EUR 162 million), supplemented by GBP 92 
million (EUR 66 million) as additional annual administrative costs to employers. The net effect, 
however, is likely to be smaller and will be partly absorbed by lower growth in salaries and by 
inflation. Additional administrative costs for the state pension system are estimated to be GBP 
211 million (EUR 152 million) and for the Personal Accounts Delivery Authority GBP 21 
million (EUR 15 million). 
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2.2. Impact of reforms on pension adequacy 
2.2.1. Benefit adequacy for current pensioners 
This section looks into the development of the ratio of the average net old age pension of the 
PAYG scheme to the average net wage of contributors. We shall examine whether the transition 
to a multi-pillar system has had any immediate negative implications for pension adequacy of 
current pensioners.  
Table 2.14. Average net pension ratio from the PAYG scheme before and after the reform 
(%) 
Country 
(reform year) 
T-3 T-2 T-1 Reform 
year 
T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+6 T+7 
Bulgaria (2000) .. 46 45 51 48 50 50 51 52 53 .. 
Estonia (2002) 53 46 43 42 43 44 43 44 .. .. .. 
Hungary (1998) .. 60 57 59 59 59 57 57 60 61 62 
Latvia (2001) 57 62 60 56 56 52 52 51 49 .. .. 
Lithuania (2004) 45 44 43 44 46 44 .. .. .. .. .. 
Poland (1999) .. 67 65 62 60 62 64 65 65 64 64 
Slovakia (2005) 56 57 57 57 56 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Sweden (1999) .. .. .. .. 47 .. 46 48 49 47 .. 
Source: National reports 
Notes: Sweden – replacement rate for males. Other countries – the average of both sexes 
 
As shown in Table 2.12 above, most of the countries studied have switched to less generous 
indexation rules of their PAYG pensions. Table 2.14 on the development of pre-reform and post-
reform pension ratios, however, indicates that, in reality, the reform has had little impact on 
replacement rates of pensions in payment.10 In other words, transition to the FF scheme has had 
no or very limited immediate effect on pension adequacy and the current pensioner population 
has not carried the burden of transition costs. 
Only in Latvia has there been a notable decline in the average net pension ratio.11 In Estonia, 
indexation rules adopted in 2002 restricted the increase of pensions, but in practice, ad hoc 
additional pension increases have been implemented annually, maintaining the average net 
                                                 
10  In Estonia, in 1999, there was an ad hoc increase of pensions by ca 20% that led to temporary increase of 
replacement rate. In Hungary, in 2003, an additional 13th month pension was implemented that increased the 
effective replacement rate. 
11  This decline has been attributed to the wage profile of cohorts who have retired (with subsequent effect on 
the initial capital in the NDC system) and to the fact that pensions in payment are not indexed to real earnings 
growth (Vanovska 2006) while real earnings have grown at a rapid rate in recent years. The amendments to the 
pension indexation provided an ad hoc increase in average pension amount in 1998. 
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replacement rate at 43-44%. Recently, in October 2007, indexation rules in Estonia have been 
relaxed, expected to reduce the need for additional ad hoc increases.12
2.2.2. Impact of reforms on future benefit adequacy 
As a rule, FF schemes entail a strong link between contributions paid into the scheme and the 
level of future benefits. Therefore, even a partial transition from PAYG to FF scheme may have 
significant implications, reducing intra-generational transfers. In relative terms, DC schemes 
provide higher benefits to persons with longer working careers and benefits are proportional to 
earnings over the lifetime. This may place parents taking care of children, unemployed, 
chronically ill and disabled persons in a disadvantaged position unless contributions are paid into 
the scheme by the state or other parties (e.g., other insurance schemes) for the periods. Transition 
to the FF schemes also has a gender dimension as women on average have shorter working 
careers than men due to child-raising responsibilities and other periods out of employment (Ginn 
2004). 
Table 2.15 summarises the types of non-working periods for which contributions are paid 
respectively to the PAYG and FF schemes.  
Table 2.15. Credited periods or contributions to PAYG and FF schemes for periods out-of-
employment 
Country 
 
+ contributions 
- no contributions 
 Maternity 
leave 
Parental 
leave 
Child 
care 
Unemployment 
benefit period 
Sickness/ 
Disability 
Other minor 
cases 
Bulgaria PAYG + + - + - + 
 FF - - - - - - 
Estonia PAYG - + + - - + 
 FF - + - - - - 
Hungary PAYG - + - + - - 
 FF + + - + - - 
Latvia PAYG + - + + + + 
 FF + - + + + + 
Lithuania PAYG + - + + - + 
 FF - - - - - - 
Poland PAYG + + - + - - 
 FF + + - + - - 
Slovakia PAYG - - + - + + 
 FF - - + - - + 
Sweden PAYG + + + + + + 
 FF + + + + + + 
United Kingdom PAYG + - + + + - 
 FF - - - - - - 
Source: National reports 
                                                 
12  Formerly, the index depended on the evolution of consumer prices and social tax revenues with the ratio of 
50-50. In the modified index the relative weight of consumer prices and social tax revenues is 20-80. Also, the flat-
rate component and contribution-based component of the pension formula are indexed according to different speeds. 
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Note: In Lithuania, persons receiving social insurance benefits (e.g. maternity or unemployment insurance benefit) 
earn pension rights as if contributions are collected from the benefit received, although no actual contributions are 
paid into the PAYG scheme. 
Latvia, Poland and Sweden take an identical approach on ‘credited’ periods both under the 
PAYG and FF schemes. Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia and the UK provide credits for 
some periods under the PAYG scheme, but not under the FF scheme (or not to the same scale). 
Table 2.16 takes a closer look at how child-raising and unemployment periods are treated in the 
PAYG and FF schemes. In Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden, these periods are treated 
equally under the PAYG and FF schemes both in terms of the duration of payment of 
contributions and the applicable contribution base.13 On the other hand, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Hungary and Lithuania treat individuals differently in the PAYG and FF schemes. 
 
Table 2.16. Contributions made to the PAYG and FF schemes for periods of raising 
children and unemployment 
  Maternity, parental leave and child-raising Unemployment period 
Country 
 
Approximate 
duration 
(months) 
Contribution base 
(or fixed amount) 
Approximate 
duration 
(months) 
Contribution base 
(or fixed amount) 
Bulgaria PAYG 25.5 
(10.5+15) 
Minimum wage 12 Minimum wage 
 FF None None None None 
Estonia PAYG 36 Flat rate contribution base 
(about 20% of average wage, 
less than minimum wage) 
None None 
 FF 14 1% on parental benefit  
 
None None 
Hungary PAYG 22 
(6+16) 
Fixed amount 9 Fixed amount 
 FF 18 
(2+16) 
1% of last wage 12 1% of gross benefit 
Latvia PAYG 22.5 
(4.5+18) 
Maternity benefit (about 
108% of average wage), 
followed by flat rate  
(about 18% of average wage) 
9 Unemployment benefit 
(initially), followed by 
flat rate (about 29% of 
average wage) 
 FF 22.5 
(4.5+18) 
Maternity benefit (about 
108% of average wage), 
followed by flat rate  
(about 18% of average wage) 
9 Unemployment benefit 
(initially), followed by 
flat rate (about 29% of 
average wage) 
Lithuania PAYG 36 50% of basic pension, about 
30% of average wage 
None None 
 FF None None None None 
Poland PAYG 28.5 
(4.5+24) 
Maternity benefit (initially), 
followed by flat rate  
(about 17% of average wage) 
18 Flat rate  
(about 20% of average 
wage) 
 FF 28.5 
(4.5+24) 
Maternity benefit (initially), 
followed by flat rate  
(about 17% of average wage) 
18 Flat rate  
(about 20% of average 
wage) 
                                                 
13  For applicable contribution rates, see Table 2.5. 
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Slovakia PAYG 72 Flat rate 
(about 60% of average wage) 
None None 
 FF 72 Flat rate 
(about 60% of average wage) 
None None 
Sweden PAYG 4 years from 
child birth 
Initially 80% of former 
wage. Later flat-rate 
supplement to earnings.  
12 80% of former wage  
 FF 4 years from 
child birth 
Initially 80% of former 
wage. Later flat-rate 
supplement to earnings.  
12 80% of former wage  
Source: National reports 
Notes: The table describes the situation as of 1 January 2007. Sweden – If the parent who makes the claim works 
during these 4 years then the benefit for these periods is smaller. 
 
Another aspect of intra-generational redistribution in the FF schemes relates to the use of unisex 
life tables for calculating the pension (life annuity) from the FF schemes. This principle has been 
legislated in Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia and Sweden. On the other hand, Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Poland and the UK have not (yet) adopted unisex life tables.  
Table 2.17. Application of unisex tables in the FF scheme 
Country Unisex tables 
Bulgaria  No 
Estonia Yes 
Hungary Yes 
Latvia Yes 
Lithuania No 
Poland No 
Slovakia Yes 
Sweden Yes 
United Kingdom No 
Source: National reports 
Notes: Latvia – There are two options for payment of pension from the funded scheme. Firstly, the accumulated 
pension capital may be transferred to a life annuity paid by a life insurance company. Secondly, the accumulated 
pension capital may be transferred to the NDC scheme, sums added to the notional capital and pension paid only 
from the NDC scheme. Unisex life tables are used only in the latter case, i.e., when the whole pension is paid from 
the NDC scheme. Poland – it is planned to use unisex life tables, however, there is still no legislation on the 
calculation and payment of pensions from the funded scheme. 
 
Unisex life tables have a certain balancing effect, narrowing the gender pension gap in a 
situation of existing differences in life expectancy (average remaining life-time) of men and 
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women at the time of retirement.14 These are in the range of 6-8 years in Hungary, Slovakia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia and Poland (Table 2.18). In Sweden, the difference in life 
expectancy between men and women at pension age is about 3 years.  
The absence of unisex life tables combined with the existing gender employment and wage gaps 
(the latter being at a range of 15-25%) may lead to a significant gender pension gap in the FF 
scheme (see Fultz et al. 2003). 
Table 2.18. Life expectancy at statutory old age 
Life expectancy at pension age Country 
Women Men Difference 
Bulgaria 22.0 14.3 7.7 
Estonia 22.2 14.1 8.1 
Hungary 21.6 15.4 6.2 
Latvia 20.8 13.8 7.0 
Lithuania 21.6 14.3 7.3 
Poland 22.8 14.5 8.3 
Slovakia 22.0 15.2 6.8 
Sweden 20.8 17.6 3.2 
UK 23.6 16.6 7.0 
Source: National reports, Hungary – Eurostat database; latest available year (2005 or 2006). 
Notes: For statutory pension age, see Table 2.13. Sweden – life expectancy at 65, which is the retirement peak.  
 
An attempt to quantify the total impact of reforms on future pension adequacy has been made by 
calculating theoretical replacement rates for four categories of persons (with varying wage level 
and length of career), broadly corresponding to the categories of average earners, low earners, 
workers with broken or short career and inactive (for details, see description in section 1.2 and 
Annex 4). 
Post-reform theoretical replacement rates are calculated based on pre-defined economic 
assumptions as agreed by the Indicators Sub-Group of the SPC. Post-reform replacement rates 
include both pensions from PAYG and FF schemes, but not occupational pensions. 
Two different sets of assumptions have been used depending on data availability for the pre-
reform theoretical replacement rates. For Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, pre-reform replacement rates are calculated on the basis of actual historical data 
(Table 2.19) — that is, comparing replacement rates before the actual reforms with the simulated 
replacement rates after the reforms are fully implemented in the future. As demographic and 
macroeconomic circumstances change, part of the absolute difference in the changes in the 
replacement rates are due to different environments. 
                                                 
14  Note that pension ages for men and women are still different in all countries studied here (except Sweden) 
women have a lower statutory pension age than men. Thus, differences in life expectancy of men and women in 
pension age are greater than differences in life expectancy at a given age, e.g., 60. 
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For Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Hungary, the pre-reform scenario replacement rates were 
calculated on the hypothetical proposition that the pre-reform situation continues for 40 years 
using the same macroeconomic developments as the post-reform scenario (Table 2.20). This 
reduces the impact of development in the demographic and macroeconomic variables when 
comparing pre- and post-reform cases. However, extension of the pre-reform case for the next 40 
years is an artificial exercise as the situation would not had been sustainable in the long run. 
Obviously, replacement rates are sensitive to the assumptions used in calculations. Therefore, 
when comparing pre- and post-reform situations, we look at qualitative aspects, in particular the 
long-term impact of the reform on the relative position of persons at different levels of wage 
level and lengths of career.  
As we are interested in relative gains we compare changes in the replacement rates of different 
worker categories with the change in the replacement rates for the average wage earner. The 
latter is taken as baseline and is set to zero (see Annex 4 for details and intermediate results) 
All the changes in replacement rates are calculated with respect to average wage earner with 
career 40 years („reference=0”). 
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where GRRj is gross replacement rate for group j. 
Table 2.19. Simulated differences in gross replacement rates before and after the reform 
introducing transition to the FF scheme: Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, UK (%) 
Country   Average wage, 
career 40 years 
2/3 average 
wage, career 40 
years 
2/3 of average 
wage, career 30 
years 
Inactive person 
entitled only to the 
minimum pension 
Bulgaria  ∆∆pp reference=0 16 23 42 
  ∆∆% reference=0 1 -1 34 
Poland  ∆pp reference=0 0 -2 34 
 ∆% reference=0 0 -9 44 
Slovakia  ∆∆pp reference=0 -21 -22 -8 
 ∆∆% reference=0 -31 -32 -22 
Sweden  ∆pp reference=0 -10 .. .. 
 ∆% reference=0 -12 .. .. 
UK ∆∆pp reference=0 7 2 -19 
 ∆∆% reference=0 6 2 -48 
Source: National reports. 
Notes: Replacement rates are in respect of average wage or 2/3 of average wage. Minimum pensions are relative to 
average wage. 
∆∆pp - absolute difference in post-reform and pre-reform replacement rates, compared to the average wage earner 
∆∆% - relative difference in post-reform and pre-reform replacement rates, compared to the average wage earner 
Poland – net replacement rates; other countries – gross replacement rates 
Sweden – pensions for inactive persons include additional housing benefits 
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While in nominal terms replacement rates tend to decrease in comparison to the pre-reform 
actual situation (see Annex 4), the relative impact of reform are however different across 
countries. In Poland and the UK, the relative impact of the reform is more or less the same for 
workers with different wage/career parameters. In Slovakia and Sweden, where the new system 
provides the same replacement rate for workers with different wage and career length, the reform 
weights relatively more on workers with wages below the average, as these workers enjoyed 
relatively higher replacement rates under the old system. In Bulgaria, the relative position of 
persons with lower than average wage and shorter careers even improves vis-à-vis the average 
wage earner with the reform, albeit in nominal terms replacement rates decline for all workers.  
Table 2.20. Simulated differences in gross replacement rates before and after the reform 
introducing transition to the FF scheme: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary (%) 
Country   Average wage, 
career 40 years 
2/3 average 
wage, career 40 
years 
2/3 of average 
wage, career 30 
years 
Inactive person 
entitled only to the 
minimum pension 
Estonia  ∆∆pp reference=0 -1 -8 -15 
 ∆∆% reference=0 -15 -38 -71 
Hungary  ∆∆pp reference=0 -14 -35 .. 
 ∆∆% reference=0 -17 -46 .. 
Latvia  ∆∆pp reference=0 0 -9 -11 
 ∆∆% reference=0 0 -15 -20 
Lithuania  ∆∆pp reference=0 0 -5 .. 
 ∆∆% reference=0 -4 -15 .. 
Source: National reports 
Notes: 
∆∆pp - absolute difference in post-reform and pre-reform replacement rates, compared to the average wage earner 
∆∆% - relative difference in post-reform and pre-reform replacement rates, compared to the average wage earner 
Hungary – net replacement rates; other countries – gross replacement rates 
Estonia – pensions for inactive persons include additional subsistence benefits  
Table 2.20 shows the results for Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania where the pre-reform 
situation has been extended to the future. It confirms the general trend that the reforms weight 
more heavily on persons with career breaks and/or lower than average wage and tend to lead to a 
higher differentiation of pensions.  
 
2.3. Features of funded schemes 
2.3.1. Investment risks and guarantees 
All other factors being equal, joining the FF scheme is advantageous to the average earner only if 
in the long run the net rate of return earned in the FF scheme exceeds the rate of pension increase 
in the PAYG scheme. However, potentially higher returns of the FF scheme are accompanied by 
significantly higher risk (see e.g., Miles and Timmermann 1999). 
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While increase of pensions in the PAYG scheme depends largely on the development of the 
gross wage bill, the funded pensions in the FF scheme depend on net returns on investment of 
pension fund assets. While legislators in most of the countries have introduced various measures 
to mitigate investment risks, only a few countries have introduced direct guarantees against 
investment risks. Table 2.21 gives an overview of the main categories of measures taken to 
mitigate investment risks in the countries concerned (see also Financial Advisory Ltd. 2003). 
Table 2.21. Measures against investment risks 
Country Limits to the 
types of 
investment 
instruments 
Limits to the 
portfolio 
structure 
Guaranteed 
rate of return 
Geographical 
restrictions 
Guarantee in 
case of fund 
mismanagement 
Responsibility 
of the fund 
management 
company 
Bulgaria  Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. 
Estonia Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Hungary Yes Yes No Yes Yes .. 
Latvia Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Lithuania Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Poland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Slovakia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes .. 
Sweden No .. No No No .. 
United 
Kingdom 
No .. No  No No .. 
Source: National reports 
Slovakia, Poland and Bulgaria have legislated a guaranteed rate of return. All these countries 
apply a relative rate of return guarantee mechanism, declaring a rate of return in relation to a 
market benchmark. Such guarantees address the concern for equity among contributors within a 
FF pension scheme. However, the other side of the coin is that such guarantees may lead fund 
managers to exhibit “herding” behaviour, regressing all funds towards similar types of portfolio 
(Sin 2002).   
In Slovakia, the pension companies have to compare the rates of returns of their pension funds 
with the average returns of all pension funds on the market. If the rate of return of the particular 
fund falls below specific thresholds given for each type of fund (as a percentage of average 
return of all funds), the pension company must increase value of that particular fund from its 
own resources. 
In Bulgaria, the second pillar pension funds are obligated to achieve a minimum rate of return of 
the invested assets. The Financial Supervisory Commission determines this rate at the end of 
each quarter on the basis of the return achieved for the preceding 24-month period. The 
minimum rate of return represents 60% of the average rate of return achieved by the pension 
funds. The rate of return has to be declared to the Financial Supervisory Commission by the end 
of each month succeeding the reporting quarter. If the pension fund achieves a lower rate of 
return than the minimum, the pension insurance company (PIC) managing the fund is obligated 
within ten days after the declaration of the return to cover the difference up to the minimum from 
reserves that have been established for this purpose. The minimum rate of return is guaranteed 
by establishing reserves at the pension fund and the PIC. The PIC establishes out of its own 
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funds a reserve for each second pillar fund in the amount between 1% and 3% of the assets of the 
respective funds. 
In Poland, the guaranteed minimum rate of return is a rate of return lower by 50 percent or 4 
percentage points (whichever is lower) than the weighted average rate of return of all pension 
funds established for a given period.15 The mechanism of a minimum relative rate of return 
guarantees the fund participants that there will be no significant negative differences between the 
rate of return generated by the fund they have chosen and the average rate of return of all 
pension funds. 
The rate of return guarantee in Poland is enacted via a three-level financial security mechanism: 
reserve fund – share capital – Guarantee Fund (Borowczyk 2002). When the rate of return of a 
pension fund for the 36-month period has fallen below the required minimum rate of return, the 
fund is considered to be in deficit (Rozinka and Tapio 2007).16  Legislation provides that in this 
case the pension fund is obliged to cover the deficit within 3 days, from resources available at 
their own reserve account, by sale of units accrued on the reserve account. Each fund is obliged 
to create and keep its own reserve account under the sanction of a penalty of up to PLN 500 
thousand (EUR 125.000). Should the assets from the reserve account be insufficient to meet the 
deficit, the fund management company is obliged to compensate the deficit from their own 
assets. These own resources – the share capital – may not be lower than EUR 4 million, of which 
50 per cent (EUR 2 million) must always be kept at bank account as own capital. If the deficit of 
the pension fund cannot be fully covered by a manager’s own reserves or from the share capital, 
the remaining deficit shall be covered by the Guarantee Fund.17 In case where the Guarantee 
Fund has to step in, the supervisory body initiates the bankruptcy procedure of the fund 
management company. In case where the Guarantee Fund lacks sufficient resources, the State 
Treasury provides the final guarantee for deficit coverage.  
The supervisory agency calculates the average nominal rate of return for all pension funds, 
weighted by the asset size of fund, at the end of each quarter. The relatively long averaging 
period provides some flexibility for pension funds. However, the prescribed sanctions imply a 
strong pressure to avoid falling below the minimum rate of return and have resulted in a 
relatively homogeneous portfolio structure of pension funds in Poland. Also, as shown by Turner 
and Rajnes (2002), the Polish guarantee system tends to reduce the variability in the nominal rate 
of return received by workers over time. 
During the first years of operation of the Polish pension system, one pension fund – Bankowy – 
failed to attain the minimum rate of return and created a deficit of PLN 35 million or EUR 9 
                                                 
15  The weighted average rate of return of all open pension funds for the 36-month period is established by 
multiplying the fund's rate of return by its average market share index. 
16  The deficit amount is established by multiplying the number of the pension fund’s accounting units 
(existing on the last working day of the 36-month period) by the difference between such accounting unit value as 
would have ensured the minimum rate of return and the real accounting unit value as established on the last working 
day of the 36-month period. 
17  Guarantee fund is created from compulsory fees payable by all pension funds and the investment income 
of the guarantee fund. The total value of the guarantee fund shall not exceed 0.1 per cent of the value of total net 
assets of all pension funds (Turner and Rajnar 2001). The Guarantee Fund has been created from compulsory 
payments of all universal pension societies. The value of its financial resources may not exceed 0.1 per cent of the 
value of total net assets of all open pension funds. 
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million and had to offset the deficit from the resources accumulated on its reserve account (Pelc 
2001).18 From 2003 onwards, all Polish pension funds have reached the minimum rate of return. 
2.3.2. Types of pension funds 
Most of the countries analyzed here have left the choice of an appropriate investment risk level 
to participants of the FF scheme. These countries allow a choice between pension funds with 
different risk levels. There are alternatives offered that differ according to the proportion of 
equity investments in the fund portfolio. This approach has been adopted in Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia and Sweden.19 A similar approach is envisaged in Bulgaria and the 
UK. In Bulgaria, participants in the FF scheme will be given the opportunity to choose pension 
funds with different investment strategies starting 2008. 
Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia have opted for division of pension funds into three categories 
according to the investment risk level, expressed in terms of the upper limit on investment of 
pension fund assets in shares. Sweden classifies funds according to risk levels, but legislation 
does not prescribe categories and participants are free to choose between funds with different 
risk level. In Lithuania, legislation does not prescribe categories of different investment 
strategies for pension funds, but each pension fund management company has more than one 
pension fund (min 2 - max 6 pension funds) with assets invested under different investment 
strategy. 
Table 2.22 presents the categories of pension funds according to the limits on portfolio structure. 
However, it must be noted that the categories of low, medium and high risk are only relative 
categories, indicating the relative risk level of a pension fund vis-à-vis other available options. 
As can be seen, medium risk funds in Lithuania and Slovakia and some low risk funds in 
Sweden would count as high risk funds in Estonia and Latvia, countries which allow a maximum 
of 50% of pension fund assets invested in shares. At the same time high risk funds in Sweden 
and Lithuania may invest up to 100% assets in shares. 
Table 2.22. Categories of pension funds according to investment risk 
 Low risk Medium risk High risk 
Estonia 100%  
in fixed income instruments Up to 25% in shares 
Up to 50%  
in shares  
Latvia 100%  
in fixed income instruments Up to 15% in shares 
Up to 50%  
in shares 
Lithuania 100%  
in fixed income instruments Up to 50% in shares 
Up to 100%  
in shares 
Slovakia 100%  
in fixed income instruments Up to 50% in shares 
Up to 80%  
in shares 
                                                 
18  The weighted average rate of return of all pension funds over the period 30.09.1999 - 28.01.2001 was 
18.091%, and the minimum rate of return was 9.046%. The rate of return achieved by Bankowy was only 1.376%, 
significantly below all other pension funds (Pelc 2001). 
19  In Hungary, since 2007, FF scheme participants can choose the pension fund with different investment and 
risk strategies. 
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Sweden 
50-90% in fixed income 
instruments,  
10-50% in shares 
10-50% in fixed income 
instruments,  
50-90% in shares,  90-100% in shares  
Source: National reports 
Note: In Latvia, the maximum proportion of assets invested in shares for high pension funds is 50% starting from 
2008.  
 
In Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia, legislation prescribes the option of low risk funds 
investing all assets in fixed income instruments. In Sweden, even funds classified as low risk 
funds may invest up to half of all assets in shares. However, it must be noted that in Sweden the 
relative size of the FF scheme (i.e., in terms of the allocated contribution rate) to top-up the 
pensions is the smallest among countries analyzed here. Existing investment restrictions and 
guarantee mechanisms are likewise evaluated against the relative role of the FF scheme in the 
overall pension system.   
The set of data in Table 2.23 shows the behaviour of FF scheme participants in choosing pension 
funds. 
Table 2.23. Distribution of FF scheme participants by risk level of pension funds 
Estonia Low risk Medium risk High risk 
Women 6 13 81 
Men 8 17 75 
15-23 3 2 95 
24-35 2 7 91 
36-44 5 21 74 
45-54 16 36 49 
55-64 45 28 27 
 
Latvia Low risk Medium risk High risk 
Women 25 4 71 
Men 26 4 71 
15-24 22 1 76 
25-34 28 2 70 
35-44 17 5 78 
45-54 58 8 34 
55-64 42 9 48 
 
Lithuania Low risk Medium risk High risk 
Women 14 84 2 
Men 12 84 4 
14-24 3 88 9 
25-34 6 91 3 
35-44 10 88 2 
45-54 28 71 1 
55-65 61 39 1 
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 Slovakia Low risk Medium risk High risk 
Total 4 27 69 
15-24 4 9 88 
25-34 2 16 82 
35-44 4 37 59 
45-54 15 71 14 
55-64 99 1 0 
 
Sweden Low risk Medium risk High risk 
Women 10 84 5 
Men 8 84 8 
18-24 15 67 18 
25-29 6 85 9 
30-39 3 90 6 
40-49 5 90 6 
50-59 14 80 6 
60+ 23 71 6 
Source: National reports 
Note: The definition of risk levels is not comparable across countries (see Table 2.22). 
Table 2.23 suggests that there is a clear preference for funds that invest a significant portion of 
assets in equities. At the same time, as the cases of Lithuania and Sweden illustrate, funds which 
invest 90-100% of assets in shares are much less attractive, i.e., the extreme is avoided. Workers 
aged 45+ opt more often for low or medium risk funds. 
In Poland, the legislation does not provide for different types of pension funds according to the 
equity investments. The original legislation of 1997 stipulated that after the initial phase with 
uniform types of pension funds, fund portfolios are to be diverted into two types by 2005 (Chłon-
Dominczak 2002).20 But this plan did not materialize as a change of legislation in 2004 that 
repealed this provision. Given that the minimum rate of return guarantee has also caused all 
funds to follow similar investment strategies, pension savers in Poland have little choice in the 
portfolio allocation of their savings. 
                                                 
20  Type A with a more risky investment strategy; and B with a more conservative investment strategy. 
 41
2.3.3.  Restrictions on changing funds 
All countries covered with this study allow participants of the FF scheme to change pension 
funds, although certain restrictions apply in some of the countries with regard to the frequency of 
changing funds or the length of participation in the fund. Change of funds may also have 
financial implications (Table 2.24). 
Table 2.24. Options and limits on changing funds 
 Alternatives Frequency 
limit 
Other limits Financial implications 
Bulgaria change of fund once a year changing is possible 
two years after the 
initial registration with 
the fund 
change of fund fee (up to 10 
EUR) 
Estonia (a) change of fund  
(changing all 
previously acquired 
units of this fund)  
(b) redirecting new 
contributions to a 
new fund (keeping 
units of the old fund) 
once a year changing of units 
possible only, if the 
person has at least 500 
units  
unit remittance fee of the 
old fund and unit issuing fee 
of the new fund 
(some fund managers waive 
the fee, if changing from 
one fund to another with the 
same fund manager) 
Hungary change of fund twice a year min 6 months  
in the fund 
max 0.1% the total private 
account claim 
Latvia (a) change of fund 
(b) change of 
investment plan with 
the same fund 
manager 
(a) once a year 
(b) twice a 
year 
none no cost 
Lithuania (a) change of fund 
management 
company 
(b) change of fund 
with the same fund 
management 
company 
none not before 3 years of 
participation 
Change of fund fee.  
Same manager: a) no charge 
if changing once a year 
b) max 0.2% if changing 
more than once a year. 
Different manager: a) max 
0.2% if changing once a 
year; b) max 4% if changing 
more than once a year 
Poland change of fund none none fixed fee, if changing earlier 
than after 2 years of 
membership 
Slovakia change of fund none 1) cannot join high-risk 
fund, if 15 years or less 
to pension age 
2) cannot join medium-
risk fund, if 7 years or 
less to pension age 
lump sum SKK 500 
Sweden change of fund  none none no individual cost 
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Source: National reports21
Note: Sweden – the overall cost of changing funds is a part of the cost of the overall fund administration, which is 
charged on an individual basis. Slovakia – No frequency limit to change the fund, but changing pension fund 
management company is restricted to once per two years. 
Sweden has the most liberal rules on changing funds, with no frequency limits and also no 
individual fees applicable. Likewise, Lithuania and Poland do not restrict the frequency of 
changing funds, but fees apply. In Latvia, there are frequency limits, but no fees involved when 
changing funds. 
The fees applicable upon changing funds discourage frequent changes. In Lithuania, the fee is 
higher if fund is changed more than once a year. 
 
2.3.4. Public education tools 
In contrast to the PAYG scheme, FF schemes entail a number of choices, subject to conditions 
stipulated in respective countries, in particular decisions about: 
• switching from the PAYG scheme to the FF scheme; 
• choosing a pension fund; 
• changing funds. 
In the future, there will also be choices on the timing of retirement and/or type of benefit 
(annuity).  
To make these choices, participants need information about the dimensions of choice, available 
alternatives, possible risks and opportunities, and likely outcomes.  
As private bodies administer the FF schemes, there are interested parties to supply information. 
In this context, it is relevant whether public education and information tools are available to 
assist participants in making relevant choices and provide balanced information. Most countries 
provide such information electronically through web sites designed specifically for this purpose. 
In Estonia, detailed information about the FF scheme is provided in a web site, 
www.pensionikeskus.ee, which is maintained by the Estonian Central Depository of Securities 
(the administrator of FF scheme pension accounts) and is available in three languages – 
Estonian, Russian and English. The web site explains the relevant provisions of the legislation 
and provides information about types of pension funds, fund portfolios, applicable fees, and 
                                                 
21  According to the reform plan of the United Kingdom, it will be possible to change target funds and move 
assets either on an annual or semi-annual basis. It is likely that there will be no cost for members changing their 
asset allocation. The Pension Commission has proposed to limit fees to an annual management charge and avoid any 
other fees as this would help keep administrative cost down. However, the government has not yet declared a clear 
preference and it is likely that the new Personal Accounts scheme will have the competence to develop appropriate 
charging structures. 
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historical performance of funds that allows comparison between different funds (ie., the 
development of the value of pension fund units). It also provides an interface for submitting 
various applications electronically, using digital identification through ID-cards, for the FF 
scheme (joining the scheme, changing funds, etc.) This interface also allows immediate access to 
data of own pension account, including the value of accrued pension assets.  
In Latvia, relevant information on the FF scheme can be accessed in the web site 
www.manapensija.lv, which is maintained by the State Social Insurance Agency in two 
languages – Latvian and Russian. The web site gives general information about the funds, 
investment plans, fund performance, and it also allows immediate access to own account data. 
Legislation also prescribes annual notification of scheme participants about their account 
balance. 
In Lithuania, the Ministry of Social Security and Labour has established an internet page 
dedicated to the pension system with focus on the FF scheme: www.pensijusistema.lt. 
Information is provided in three languages (Lithuanian, Russian, English). The web site provides 
general information on pension funds with links to the web pages of funds and a comparative 
table of administrative charges of pension funds. The web page also includes a calculator to 
compare the amount of pension in case of joining the FF scheme or remaining in the PAYG 
scheme and also calculate the accumulated pension capital under different investment returns 
and fee rates. It is the obligation of the pension fund management company to provide 
information on the historical investment performance of the pension fund on its internet page. 
The fund management company is also obliged to provide every participant an annual 
information on accumulated pension capital, including tax deduction and investment returns. 
In Slovakia, the Ministry of Labour has set-up a web page with general information about 
different types of pension funds and their risk characteristics, including projections of 
replacement rates for specific individuals. There is also a web site maintained by the association 
of the private pension companies that provides information on historical performance of pension 
funds, fees for the fund management, etc. Legislation mandates the publication of information 
about performance and fees on a web page of the particular pension company. 
In Poland, the Association of Pension Funds is the main provider of general information on the 
pension system with focus on the funded pillar. It maintains the web site at 
http://www.igte.com.pl/ with information about investment regulations, fees, historical 
performance of funds and links to all fund management companies. The website of the Polish 
Financial Supervision Authority (Polish abbreviation KNF), in Polish and English, 
www.knf.gov.pl, also provides information on the Funded Pension System. 
In Sweden, information on the FF scheme is concentrated on the web site www.ppm.nu, 
maintained by the Premium Pension Authority (PPM). The web site contains information in 
various languages – Swedish, English, Finnish, Serbo-Croatian, Arabic and Turkish. It gives 
information on choices available in the FF scheme, types of funds, histories of returns, risk 
evaluation, fees applicable, etc. The site also has a ‘my account’ feature for immediate access to 
personal pension account. There is also an interactive internet tool, PPM-Lotsen, which is 
designed to facilitate the choice of a pension fund portfolio based on personal answers on 
income, age and risk acceptance. The tool suggests a list of suitable funds; the list is organised in 
such a way that the fund with the lowest fund fee appears at the top of the list. This tool is 
particularly relevant, considering the high number funds available in the Swedish scheme. Daily 
information about funds performance is available at the PPM web site and in major daily 
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newspapers. At the beginning of every year, the national social security office and PPM send out 
annual information (the “orange letter” – named after the color of the envelope) containing 
account information and pension projections based on the individual’s account and most recent 
earnings, projected forward with an assumed rate of growth and average rate of return on funds.  
In the UK, where the reform is still in the planning stage, a wide array of different media 
(newspapers, magazines, radio, internet) report on investment funds and their performance. In 
addition, government information strategy for communicating the planned changes to the 
pension system and the principles of the fund selection is being prepared. 
In Bulgaria, the web page of National Social Security Institute www.nssi.bg has historical 
reports on the financial performance of the funds. It is also available in English. 
In Hungary, participants can find information about pension funds at the home page of the 
Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority. There is also a web page www.privatbankar.hu on 
historical performance of the funds and projected replacement rates under different scenarios.  
2.3.5. Fees  
Since the FF schemes are self-financing, all costs of their operation are covered by the scheme’s 
own resources. As such, the fee structure will have significant impact on future benefits and 
hence, on pension adequacy. The fee structure is also an instrument that influences the choices 
and behaviour of fund participants. For example, unit remittance and change of fund fees place 
negative incentives to change funds. 
The challenge for the government is how to regulate the fee structure so as to maintain a proper 
incentive structure for fund participants as well as for fund managers. Additional consideration is 
to avoid placing heavy burden on low-income earners. 
Table 2.25 presents the main types of fees applicable. 
Table 2.25. Fees payable by participants of the FF scheme (basis, legal limits, range) 
Country  
  
 Unit  
purchasing 
fee 
Unit 
remittance 
fee 
Fund 
management fee 
Account 
maintenance 
fee 
Other 
Bulgaria Fee base % of contribution 
none % of fund value 
(annual average) 
none 
 Limits max 5%  max 1%  
 Fee range ..  ..  
Small fees for account 
creation,  
changing fund, early 
withdrawal 
Estonia   Fee base % of unit stock value 
% of unit 
stock value 
% of net fund 
value (annual 
none 
 
Limits none max 1% fixed income 
funds: max 1.5%   
equity funds: max 
2% 
 
 Fee range 1.0-3.0% 1.0%  (all funds)
 0.75-1.88%  
no other fees 
permitted 
Hungary   
Fee base annual 
revenue 
without yield 
% of stock 
value  
% of fund value 
(annual average) 
flat rate  
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 Limits in 2007:  
max 5.5%, 
from 2008 
max 4.5% 
none max 0.9 % in 
2007 
max 0.8 % from 
2008 
 
 Fee range 4-5%  0.5-1% 130-200 HUF 
Latvia   
Fee base none % of annual 
average net 
assets 
% of annual 
average net assets 
% of annual 
payments 
 
Limits  max is set by 
pension fund 
manager 
max is set by 
pension fund 
manager 
max 2.5% 
 Fee range  0-0.25%  0.75-1.52% 1.25% 
 
Lithuania  Fee base % of contribution 
  % of fund value 
(annual average) 
 
  Limits max 10%  max 1%  
 Fee range 1.19%-5.5%   0.95-1.0%  
change of fund fee 
Poland   Fee base % of contribution 
 % of net fund 
value (monthly 
 
 
Limits max 7%  0.015-0.045% 
depending on 
volume
 
 Fee range 4-7%   0.015-0.045%  
change of fund fee: 
80 or 160 PLN 
depending on the 
length of membership 
in the fund 
Slovakia   Fee base None None % of net fund value (monthly 
% of 
contribution 
 
Limits   0.065% 
(max 0.075% for 
first three years 
after the pension 
company gets the 
licence)
1% (monthly) 
 
Fee range       
Transfer fee of 
payment through 
Social Insurance 
Agency to pension 
fund: 0.5% of 
contribution 
monthly.  
Change of fund 
fee: lump-sum 500 
SKK 
Sweden   Fee base None None % of fund value (annual average) 
flat rate 
 Limits    max 100 SEK 
 Fee range   0.2-1.5%  0.16% from each account 
 
Source: National reports 
Notes: Estonia – until 1.1.2007 there was a maximum limit on unit purchasing fee 3%. Hungary – until 2007 there 
was no limit on the unit purchasing fee. Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – for a change of fund fee, see 
Table 2.24. Poland – the maximum limit of unit purchasing fee will decrease to 3.5% from 2014. United Kingdom – 
the Pension Commission had proposed to limit fees to an annual management charge and avoid any other fees as 
this would help keep administrative cost down. However, at this point the government has not declared a clear 
preference and it is likely that the new Personal Accounts scheme will have the competence to develop appropriate 
charging structures. 
Contribution-based charges are ‘front-loaded’, placing a burden in early years. Asset-based 
charges are ‘back-loaded’ as the accumulated fund is larger closer to retirement (Whitehouse 
2000).  
Clearly, different fee structures can be observed (see also Chłon-Dominczak 2003 and Fultz 
2006). In Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Lithuania, the fee structure is more front-loaded. These 
states allow rather high up-front fees, but asset-based fund management fees are more restricted. 
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In Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Sweden, the fee structure is more back-loaded with relatively 
small or no up-front (unit purchasing) fees, but more heavy reliance on fund management fees. 
Sweden, Slovakia, Latvia and Hungary also allow account maintenance fees. 
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 3. Conclusions 
 
Transition from a PAYG pension system to a mixed system, which includes PAYG and FF tiers 
remains a highly debated topic among academics (see e.g., Ribhegge 1999; Orszag and Stiglitz 
2001; Holzmann et al. 2003; Müller 2003; Cesarrato 2006). Transition costs, pension adequacy 
and distributional impacts are obviously very important considerations when planning and 
implementing such reforms. 
Over the period 1998 – 2005, eight of the current twenty seven EU Member States have 
undertaken pension reforms entailing a partial shift from a PAYG to a FF scheme: Hungary, 
Sweden, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Bulgaria. Seven of these countries are 
new Member States from Central and Eastern Europe. Remarkably, most countries undertaking 
such reforms (except Poland) have been spending on pensions below the EU average. 
Countries have undertaken the partial transition from a PAYG to a FF pension scheme with the 
broad agenda to improve the long-term financial sustainability of the pension system. Further 
considerations of Governments have included strengthening individual responsibility towards 
retirement income, diversifying sources of retirement income, coping with demographic 
pressures, increasing financial transparency, and advancing of financial markets. However, 
besides rational policy choices, the paradigmatic change involving transition from the PAYG to 
the FF scheme bears also significant ideational motivations (Leppik 2006).  
Budgetary implications 
In spite of some broad similarities in the reform strategy, the reforms have been undertaken in 
rather different fiscal circumstances. In Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia the PAYG 
scheme was already in deficit (i.e., expenditures exceeding contribution revenues in a given 
year) prior to the introduction of reforms. Hence, diverting a part of the former PAYG 
contribution to the FF scheme has only increased fiscal pressures. Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Slovakia have simultaneously instituted two major reforms on the financing side of the pension 
system. Aside from taking on partial transition to the FF scheme, these states have further 
reduced the PAYG contribution rate, moving more towards general revenue financing of the 
remaining PAYG scheme. Both reforms create the need for additional financing.  
On the other hand, the pre-reform fiscal situation in the Baltic countries was more favourable as 
a result of economic developments. Economic growth and increasing employment rates in these 
countries have considerably mitigated the fiscal difficulties that come with the transition, 
allowing the Baltic countries to build up reserves of the PAYG pension scheme (about 3% of 
GDP in Estonia and 2% of GDP in Latvia and Lithuania). Sweden has had a large reserve fund 
amounting to over 30% of GDP at the outset, which, as a result, facilitated designing a particular 
reform and cushioning transition costs within the system. 
When analysing transition costs, it is useful to make analytical distinction between gross and net 
transition costs. The former is defined by the total contributions transferred to the FF scheme, 
while the latter relates to the difference between post-reform revenues and expenditures of the 
remaining PAYG scheme. Gross annual transition costs, sometimes conceived as opportunity 
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costs, can be quantified through the inflow of revenues to the FF scheme. The actual financial 
burden for governments is expressed trough the notion of net transition costs. However, precise 
measuring of net transition costs is difficult. Firstly, the size of transition costs depends on a 
number of variables: the contribution rate redirected from the PAYG to the FF scheme; policies 
in respect of joining the FF scheme; participant behaviour in response to these policies; average 
earnings of FF scheme participants. Secondly, transition costs are influenced (and can be 
mitigated) by simultaneous policy changes in the PAYG scheme. Therefore, the counterfactual is 
not always clear, i.e. against which situation transition costs are to be measured.  
The highest contribution rates diverted from the former PAYG scheme to the FF scheme are in 
Slovakia (9%) and Hungary (8%), whereas in Sweden the FF scheme relatively small with 2.5% 
contribution rate. Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania opted for a gradual increase in the contribution 
rate for the FF scheme to ease transition costs in the first post-reform years, Latvia starting with 
the lowest contribution rate for the FF scheme at 2%, but aiming to increase it to 10% by 2010. 
The methods of shouldering transition costs in the early post-reform years vary from country to 
country, but often include a mix of different methods and sources. Bulgaria and Poland have 
made significant transfers from the state budget to cover the loss of revenues of the PAYG 
scheme. Estonia, Slovakia and Sweden have relied mostly on previously accumulated reserves. 
Hungary has used also some debt financing along with budget transfers. 
In most of the countries – specifically, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia – there is 
still no long-term strategy on financing transition costs. In Hungary and Bulgaria, while relevant 
strategy papers have been formally adopted, experts question their practicability. 
Joining the FF schemes 
Hungary, Lithuania, Estonia and Slovakia allowed the broadest choice, permitting all employed 
persons to join the FF scheme. Bulgaria adopted the most restrictive policy, setting the cut-off 
age at 40. Poland and Latvia opted for a middle way, imposing mandatory participation on 
persons under 30 at the time of the reform, allowing choice for persons aged 30-50, and 
restricting access to all over 50. In Sweden it was mandatory for all persons under 62 to join the 
new system. 
Apart from Sweden, the highest participation rates in the FF schemes are observed in Poland and 
Bulgaria (over 90% of the employed), followed by Latvia and Estonia (about 75%). In Hungary 
and Slovakia, participation rates are around 60-70%. In Lithuania, participation rate exceeds 
50%. The further evolution of participation rates are also influenced by the time window for 
joining the FF scheme for cohorts whose participation was optional. In Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania the option of joining the FF scheme is still open (although in Estonia only for younger 
cohorts born 1974-1982). In Slovakia, the Parliament recently opened the possibility to switch 
back from the FF scheme to the PAYG scheme, although for a limited time period. In Latvia, 
there is a possibility to switch back to the PAYG scheme at the time of retirement, withdrawing 
the whole benefit from the NDC scheme. Obviously, such policies have significant effect on the 
development of transition costs. 
The highest annual inflows of revenues to the FF scheme are observed in Poland, exceeding 
1.4% of GDP. In Hungary, Estonia and Slovakia funded schemes also accumulate over 1% of 
GDP a year. In Sweden, although the contribution rate is the lowest among countries analysed 
here, funds accumulate close to 1% of GDP due to universal coverage of the FF scheme. 
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Parallel reforms of the PAYG schemes 
Parallel to the introduction of the FF schemes, most of the states in this study have undertaken 
various reforms of their remaining PAYG schemes, including changes in indexation of pensions 
in payment, increasing the statutory pension age, reducing the options for earlier retirement, and 
changing the PAYG pension formula. While these policy measures were mostly not taken with 
the aim of reducing transition costs, it is clear that such measures have a very significant long-
term impact on the development of transition costs. 
Impact on adequacy of pensions 
Analysis of the average net pension ratio of the PAYG scheme reveals that implemented reforms 
have had no or very limited immediate effect on average pension ratios, implying that the current 
elderly has not had to carry the burden of transition costs. Nevertheless, implications on future 
benefit adequacy are likely to be significant. Transition from the PAYG to the FF scheme entails 
not only a change in the financing principle, but often also in the distributional patterns, reducing 
intra-generational transfers.  
As FF schemes involve a strong link between contributions and benefits, we analysed the extent 
to which periods out of employment, in particular periods of raising children and period of 
unemployment give pension rights in these schemes. Latvia, Poland and Sweden take an 
identical approach on ‘credited’ periods both under the PAYG and FF schemes. However, in 
Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania parents caring for children are less well off in respect of their 
pension rights under the FF scheme than under the PAYG scheme, because either no 
contributions are paid for some periods of child-raising or contributions are paid at a lower rate. 
This aspect has a strong gender dimension as women on average have shorter working careers 
than men due to child-raising responsibilities. 
Another gender aspect relates to the existing differences in life expectancy between men and 
women, which will have significance when calculating annuities from the FF schemes. To 
counterbalance this effect, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia and Sweden have legislated the 
use of unisex life tables. On the other hand, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland and the UK have not 
adopted unisex life tables, which in combination with the existing gender employment and wage 
gaps may lead to a significant gender pension gap in the FF scheme. 
Future benefit adequacy of the FF schemes depends highly on the actual net returns from 
investment of pension fund assets. However, as is well known, potentially higher returns of FF 
schemes are accompanied with higher risks. While most of the countries have instituted an array 
measures to mitigate investment risks of pension funds, only Slovakia, Poland and Bulgaria have 
legislated a rate of return guarantee, applying a relative rate of return mechanism. However, in 
Poland this has lead pension fund managers to follow similar investment strategies, restricting 
the choice of portfolio allocation for pension savers. 
Choices in the FF scheme 
Participation in the FF scheme entails a number of choices and decisions to be made such as 
joining the FF scheme, choosing a pension fund, changing funds, on timing of retirement and 
some choices with regard to the form of benefit. Most countries have introduced public 
information tools, including the provision of relevant information electronically through web 
sites designed specifically for this purpose. In Estonia and Latvia, the system is particularly 
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transparent as participants of the FF scheme have among others electronic access to their 
individual pension account data. 
All countries analysed here, except Poland, allow participants of the FF scheme a choice 
between pension funds with different investment strategies. Analysis of participant behaviour 
indicates that there is clear preference for funds that invest a significant portion of assets in 
equities. In Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia, 70% or more of the FF scheme participants have opted 
for funds which invest the maximum allowed portion of assets in equities. At the same time, 
Lithuanian and Swedish cases illustrate that funds which invest 90-100% of assets in equities are 
much less attractive, i.e., the extreme is avoided. Workers aged 45+ opt more often for low or 
medium risk funds. All countries allow changing of funds, however subject to some frequency 
limits (in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary and Latvia) and financial implications (all countries, except 
Latvia and Sweden). 
Administrative charges 
Generally, administrative costs of FF schemes tend to be significantly higher than in PAYG 
schemes (European Commission 2003) and hence the need for policies to reduce administrative 
charges recognized (Social Protection Committee 2005). Different fees structures are observed in 
the countries studied here. Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Lithuania apply a front-loaded fee 
structure that allows a rather high up-front unit purchasing fees, but restricts more strongly asset-
based fund management fees. In contrast, the fee structure in the countries of Estonia, Latvia, 
Slovakia and Sweden is more back-loaded with relatively small, and even no, up-front fees; but 
these countries rely more heavily on fund management fees. Most of the countries have 
introduced limits on the levels of administrative charges in the form of ceilings expressed as a 
percentage of contributions or of assets.  
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Annex 1 – Overview of country reforms  
 
Bulgaria 
 
The pension reform in Bulgaria has been implemented since 2000. The compulsory pension 
system comprises of two pillars: the public PAYG scheme and the supplementary mandatory 
funded pension insurance. 
In the PAYG scheme, reform measures have introduced a stronger link between pensions 
received and contributions made. Since 2000, the pension age has been gradually increased from 
the former level of 60 for men and 55 for women to 63 for men and 59 for women in 2007. The 
pension age of women will continue to increase to reach 60 in 2009. 
Contribution to the PAYG pension scheme stood in 2006 at 23% of the individual insured 
income, reduced from the former rate of 29% in 2005. The minimum and maximum level of the 
insured income is specified by the Parliament for each year. 
All persons born after 31 December 1959 who are insured under the public PAYG scheme shall 
participate in a universal pension fund. The contribution rate payable towards the funded scheme 
in 2006 was 4% of the individual insured income, 2.6% paid by employer and 1.4% by 
employee.  
Employees working under harmful or hazardous working conditions are insured additionally in a 
professional pension fund for early retirement pensions. Contributions to the professional 
pension fund are paid by the employer, the contribution rate in 2006 was 12% for the first 
category (more hazardous working conditions) and 7% for the second category (less hazardous 
working conditions). 
 
Estonia 
 
The pension reform in Estonia started in 1998, modifying the pay-as-you-go scheme and 
introducing new mandatory and voluntary funded components. 
The statutory pension system comprises of two types of schemes: the state PAYG DB pensions 
and mandatory funded DC pensions. In the PAYG scheme, pensions can be divided into two 
groups: employment-related and national pensions. Employment-related pensions (old age, 
invalidity, survivors) are financed by 20 percentage points (or 16 in the case of members of the 
mandatory funded pillar) of the 33% social tax, paid by employers. The national pension is a 
flat-rate minimum pension for those who are not entitled to an employment-related benefit. 
National pensions are financed from the general state budget. 
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The compulsory funded DC scheme was introduced in 2002 by diverting a portion of 
contributions from the statutory PAYG scheme into private funds. Participation in the funded 
DC scheme is mandatory only for persons born in 1983 or later (i.e., new entrants to the labour 
market). For people born between 1942 and 1982 joining the scheme was voluntary. For younger 
cohorts, the window of choice for joining the funded scheme remains open until 2010.  
Participation in the second pillar entails an additional individual contribution of 2% of gross 
wage to be paid by employee. This is supplemented by the state with 4% of gross wage, being 
re-directed from the pension insurance part of social tax paid by employers. The total 
contribution to the second pillar is thus 6% of gross wage. 
Benefits can be received upon reaching the standard retirement age. First benefits should be paid 
in 2009. The funded scheme covers only the risk of old age. Invalidity and survivor risks are 
covered only by the PAYG scheme. 
Contributions are directed to a pension fund at the choice of a participant. Pension fund assets 
are managed by private fund managers. There are 3 different categories of second pillar pension 
funds: 
- low-risk funds, which invest only in fixed-interest  instruments (bonds, money market 
instruments and bank deposits); 
- medium-risk funds, which invest up to 25% of assets in equities; 
- higher-risk funds, which invest the maximum allowed amount (50%) of assets in equities.
  
Accordingly, participants of the second pillar have the choice of the risk level depending on 
investment strategy of the pension fund. Each fund manager is obliged to establish a low-risk 
fund. In 2007, 6 fund managers operate on the market, administering a total of 15 different 
pension funds: 6 low-risk, 3 medium-risk and 6 higher-risk funds. 
 
Hungary 
 
Since the 1997 pension reform the mandatory public pension system consists of two tiers. The 
first tier is a publicly managed, pay-as-you-go financed, defined-benefit, social security pension 
scheme that covers all employees and the self-employed. It provides earnings related to old-age, 
disability and survivors benefits. The pension age for claiming a full pension, which was 55 for 
women and 60 for men under the former system, is being raised gradually to 62 years (for men 
by 2002 and for women by 2009). 
The contribution rate for pensions in 2007 was 29.5%, increased from 26.5% in 2006. 
Participants of the FF scheme pay 8 percentage points towards the funded pension. New entrants 
to the labour market are compulsorily enrolled in the funded scheme, while those who had 
already acquired PAYG pension rights before 1998 could voluntarily opt for the new system at 
the time of its inception. 
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Latvia 
 
Reform of the PAYG pension scheme was implemented in Latvia in January 1996 and the 
former DB pension scheme was diverted into a notional defined contribution scheme. Social 
insurance contributions for pensions (20% of gross wage) are recorded in notional individual 
accounts, and indexed with increase in average social insurance contributions’ wages until 
retirement. Pensions are calculated by dividing the amount accumulated in the notional account 
by projected cohort unisex life expectancy at retirement. 
The funded DC pension scheme started operation in July 2001. It is a FF statutory pension 
scheme, in which the State Treasury or private pension fund managers invest a part of the social 
insurance contributions. The contribution rate to the mandatory funded pillar was 2% from 2001 
to 2006, and increased to 4% in 2007. The contribution rate to the funded scheme is set to 
gradually increase in the next years, to 8% in 2008, 9% in 2009 and 10% from 2010 onwards, 
with respective decline in the PAYG contribution rate as the total pension contribution rate 
remains at 20%. 
 
Lithuania 
 
Lithuania's statutory social insurance pension system consists of two tiers: the state PAYG DB 
pensions and a mandatory funded DC scheme. The state social insurance pension system was 
reformed in 1995, introducing the insurance principle, extending the requirement for 
contributory years, and increasing the pension age. 
 
The total pension contribution is 26% of gross wage: 23.5% being paid by the employer and 
2.5% by the employee. 
 
The mandatory funded pension scheme was introduced in 1 January 2004. Participation in the 
funded scheme is voluntary through a mechanism of partial opting out from the PAYG scheme. 
Entitled to join the funded scheme are persons insured with the PAYG scheme aged under the 
statutory pension age. The contribution rate for the funded scheme was diverted from the social 
insurance contribution and has been increased from 2.5% in 2004 to 5.5% of gross wage in 2007. 
 
Poland 
 
Poland has introduced significant reforms of its pension system since 1999. The statutory 
pension system implemented in 1999 consists of two mandatory schemes: a PAYG NDC 
scheme, administered by the state, and a FF DC scheme, managed by private fund managers. 
Thus, both statutory schemes depend on the DC principle.  
 
However, there is a guaranteed minimum pension which is paid if the total pension from the two 
DC schemes is below the statutory minimum old-age pension, conditional upon a contribution 
period of 25 years of insurance for men and 20 years for women. The guaranteed minimum 
pensions are covered from the state budget. 
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The retirement age is 65 for men and 60 for women. There are special schemes for farmers and 
some civil servants. 
 
The old-age pension contribution is 19.52% of gross salary (subject to the ceiling of 2.5 times 
the national average earnings), equally shared between employers and employees. From the total 
contribution, 12.22% is allocated for NDC pensions and 7.3% for the FF scheme. An additional 
contribution of 13% of wages is paid for disability and survivor pensions. From 2002, the NDC 
scheme includes a Demographic Reserve Fund financed by a small share of old-age 
contributions (0.2% of wages in 2005 to increase to 0.4% in 2009).  
 
Slovakia 
 
The Slovak pension system has undergone a major reform in 2005 splitting the statutory old-age 
pension scheme (survivor's benefits included) into two tiers: one being PAYG DB scheme, the 
other a FF DC scheme. According to the original rules, all new entrants to the labour market 
were enrolled in the new two-tier system. However, since 2008 participation was made voluntary 
also for new entrants to the labour market. Those already working at the time of inception of the 
reform had to choose by June 2006 whether to join the new system or stay in the old system. 
From January 2008 until June 2008 the system is re-opened in both ways: to switch from the 
PAYG to the FF scheme, or from the FF scheme back to the PAYG scheme. Both the PAYG and 
the FF scheme receive a contribution rate of 9% of wages for old age pensions. An additional 6% 
is collected by the PAYG scheme for disability benefits. The reform started a gradual rise of 
pension ages to 62 for both men and women, to be reached by 2007 and 2015, respectively. 
Previously the pension age for men was 60, and for women 53-57 (depending on the number of 
children). 
 
Sweden 
 
From 1999, the statutory pension system comprises of two elements: the PAYG NDC scheme 
and the FF DC scheme. The system is financed from social security contributions, which are 
planned to be kept constant at the level of 18.5% of pensionable earnings (subject to a ceiling). 
From the total contribution, 16% are financing PAYG NDC pensions, the remaining 2.5% are 
invested in one or more funds selected by the member (the so-called premium pension). Funding 
for the FF scheme already began in 1995, with funds being held on an account at the National 
Debt Office with a bond rate of return, although individual accounts were not created until 1999.  
 
In the NDC scheme, contributions earn a notional interest rate following income growth, while 
pensions are indexed with income growth minus 1.6%. At the time of retirement, the notional 
capital in the NDC scheme is converted to a pension, taking into account the remaining life 
expectancy. Partial pension (25%, 50% or 75%) may be drawn. The capital accumulated under 
the premium pension can be either paid out from the pension fund or transferred into an annuity. 
 
There is an old-age guarantee pension that provides a minimum pension for persons aged 65 
years or over. The guarantee pension is proportional to the years of residence in Sweden 
(maximum after 40 years of residence). It is financed by general taxes, price-indexed and not 
reduced by wage income, capital income, and occupational or private pension benefits. 
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Survivors’ pensions are covered by general taxes. Disability pensions are paid under the sickness 
insurance scheme. 
 
United Kingdom 
 
In the UK, the statutory state pension system consists of a flat-rate basic pension and an 
earnings-related additional pension, the State Second Pension that reformed the previous State 
Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS). These two tiers are financed through National 
Insurance contributions. Earnings-related pensions of government sector employees are covered 
in part by the state budget.  
 
State pension age is 65 for men and 60 for women but legislation is in place to equalise pension 
age of men and women at 65 by 2020. A full flat-rate basic State Pension normally requires 44 
qualifying years of National Insurance Contributions (which may include some credits) for men 
and 39 years for women.  
 
A feature of the UK pension system is the possibility to contract out of the additional State 
Pension. This requires coverage by an occupational or personal pension scheme providing 
equivalent or better benefits than the earnings-related component of the statutory scheme. 60% 
of the employed are in such contracted-out schemes and are entitled to a National Insurance 
contribution rebate. The State Second Pension, which was introduced in 2002, enables people on 
lower earnings to build up their pension entitlements. In addition, individuals are credited second 
pension rights for periods when they cannot work due to caring responsibilities or disability. 
 
Pension Credit introduced in 2003 is an income-related benefit for people aged 60 or over. It is 
targeted at the least well off pensioners and the income test is more generous than for previous 
income-related benefits. 
 
 
Sources: European Commission (2006). Synthesis report on adequate and sustainable pensions: 
country summaries; MISSOC database; national reports 
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 Annex 2 – European common pension objectives 
 
The Laeken European Council of December 2001 decided to apply the open method of 
coordination in the area of pensions with the broad aim ‘to safeguard the adequacy of pensions 
whilst maintaining their financial sustainability and facing the challenges of changing social 
needs’. The Council adopted 11 common objectives to meet these aspirations, which read as 
follows (Council of the European Union 2001): 
• Adequacy of pensions 
Member States should safeguard the capacity of pension systems to meet their social 
objectives. To this end against the background of their specific national circumstances they 
should: 
1. Ensure that older people are not placed at risk of poverty and can enjoy a decent standard of 
living; that they share in the economic well-being of their country and can accordingly 
participate actively in public, social and cultural life; 
2. Provide access for all individuals to appropriate pension arrangements, public and/or private, 
which allow them to earn pension entitlements enabling them to maintain, to a reasonable 
degree, their living standard after retirement; and 
3. Promote solidarity within and between generations. 
• Financial sustainability of pension systems 
Member States should follow a multi-faceted strategy to place pension systems on a sound 
financial footing, including a suitable combination of policies to: 
4. Achieve a high level of employment through, where necessary, comprehensive labour market 
reforms, as provided by the European Employment Strategy and in a way consistent with the 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines; 
5. Ensure that, alongside labour market and economic policies, all relevant branches of social 
protection, in particular pension systems, offer effective incentives for the participation of older 
workers; that workers are not encouraged to take up early retirement and are not penalised for 
staying in the labour market beyond the standard retirement age; and that pension systems 
facilitate the option of gradual retirement; 
6. Reform pension systems in appropriate ways taking into account the overall objective of 
maintaining the sustainability of public finances. At the same time sustainability of pension 
systems needs to be accompanied by sound fiscal policies, including, where necessary, a 
reduction of debt. Strategies adopted to meet this objective may also include setting up dedicated 
pension reserve funds; 
7. Ensure that pension provisions and reforms maintain a fair balance between the active and the 
retired by not overburdening the former and by maintaining adequate pensions for the latter; and 
 60
8. Ensure, through appropriate regulatory frameworks and through sound management, that 
private and public funded pension schemes can provide pensions with the required efficiency, 
affordability, portability and security. 
• Modernisation of pension systems in response to changing needs of the economy, society 
and individuals 
9. Ensure that pension systems are compatible with the requirements of flexibility and security 
on the labour market; that, without prejudice to the coherence of Member States' tax systems, 
labour market mobility within Member States and across borders and non-standard employment 
forms do not penalise people's pension entitlements and that self-employment is not discouraged 
by pension systems; 
10. Review pension provisions with a view to ensuring the principle of equal treatment between 
women and men, taking into account obligations under EU law; and  
11. Make pension systems more transparent and adaptable to changing circumstances, so that 
citizens can continue to have confidence in them. Develop reliable and easy-to-understand 
information on the long-term perspectives of pension systems, notably with regard to the likely 
evolution of benefit levels and contribution rates. Promote the broadest possible consensus 
regarding pension policies and reforms. Improve the methodological basis for efficient 
monitoring of pension reforms and policies. 
 
New common objectives from 2006 
 
On basis of the Commission Communication "Working together, working better: A new 
framework for the open coordination of social protection and inclusion policies in the European 
Union" (Commission of the European Communities 2006), the European Council adopted in 
March 2006 a new framework for the social protection and social inclusion process. 
The existing open methods of coordination in the fields of social inclusion and pensions, and the 
process of co-operation in the field of health and long-term care, were brought together. 
The overarching objectives of the Open Method of Co-ordination for social protection and social 
inclusion are to promote: 
• social cohesion, equality between men and women and equal opportunities for all through 
adequate, accessible, financially sustainable, adaptable and efficient social protection 
systems and social inclusion policies;  
• effective and mutual interaction between the Lisbon objectives of greater economic 
growth, more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, and with the EU's Sustainable 
Development Strategy;  
• good governance, transparency and the involvement of stakeholders in the design, 
implementation and monitoring of policy. 
The following objectives apply to pensions. 
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Adequate and sustainable pensions by ensuring: 
• adequate retirement incomes for all and access to pensions which allow people to 
maintain, to a reasonable degree, their living standard after retirement, in the spirit of 
solidarity and fairness between and within generations; 
• the financial sustainability of public and private pension schemes, bearing in mind 
pressures on public finances and the ageing of populations, and in the context of the three 
pronged strategy for tackling the budgetary implications of ageing, notably by: 
supporting longer working lives and active ageing; by balancing contributions and 
benefits in an appropriate and socially fair manner; and by promoting the affordability 
and the security of funded and private schemes; 
• that pension systems are transparent, well adapted to the needs and aspirations of women 
and men and the requirements of modern societies, demographic ageing and structural 
change; that people receive the information they need to plan their retirement and that 
reforms are conducted on the basis of the broadest possible consensus. 
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Annex 3 − Details of replacement rate calculations 
Table A1. Simulated gross replacement rates before and after the reform introducing 
transition to the FF scheme: Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, UK (%) 
Country   Average wage, 
career 40 years 
2/3 average 
wage, career 40 
years 
2/3 of average 
wage, career 30 
years 
Inactive person 
entitled only to 
the minimum 
pension 
Bulgaria  Pre 85 57 43 23 
 Post 38 26 19 18 
  ∆pp -47 -31 -24 -5 
 ∆% -55 -54 -56 -22 
Poland  Pre 78 78 69 24 
 Post 44 44 33 24 
 ∆pp -34 -34 -36 0 
 ∆% -44 -44 -52 0 
 SPC post 44 44   
  SPC ∆pp -34 -34 .. .. 
Slovakia  Pre 51 72 72 32 
 Post 54 54 53 27 
 ∆ 3 -18 -18 -5 
 ∆% 6 -25 -26 -16 
 SPC post 50 50 .. .. 
  SPC ∆pp 1 -9 .. .. 
Sweden  Pre 53 63 50 ~35 
 Post 40 40 .. (35) 
 ∆ -13 -23 ..  
 ∆% -25 -37 .. .. 
 SPC post 40 40 .. .. 
  SPC ∆pp -13 -23 .. .. 
United  Pre 40 48 42 0 
Kingdom Post 59 74 63 0 
 ∆ 19 26 21 0 
 ∆% 48 54 50 0 
 SPC post 19 28 21 .. 
  SPC ∆pp 2 3 .. .. 
Source: National reports; SPC: figures from “Current and prospective theoretical pension replacement rates”, Report 
by the Indicators Sub-Group of the SPC, 19 May2006 – Table 4, Statutory pensions, and country tables, year 2050. 
 
Notes: 
Replacement rates are with the respect of average wage or 2/3 of average wage. Minimum pensions are relative to 
average wage. 
Pre – actual pre-reform replacement rates, calculated on the basis of actual historical data 
Post – simulated post-reform replacement rates 
∆ - absolute difference in post-reform and pre-reform replacement rates 
∆% - relative difference in post-reform and pre-reform replacement rates 
SPC post – simulated post-reform replacement rates from the Social Protection Committee study 
SPC ∆pp – absolute difference in post-reform and pre-reform replacement rates from the Social Protection 
Committee study 
Poland – net replacement rates; other countries – gross replacement rates. 
Sweden – pensions for inactive persons will have additional housing benefits top-up the pensions. 
For UK SPC figures include only gross replacement rates from the 1st pillar and not occupational pensions.  
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Table A2. Simulated gross replacement rates before and after the reform introducing 
transition to the FF scheme: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary (%) 
Country   Average wage, 
career 40 years 
2/3 average 
wage, career 40 
years 
2/3 of average 
wage, career 30 
years 
Inactive person 
entitled only to 
the minimum 
pension 
Estonia  Pre 21 25 21 7 
 Post 36 39 33 7 
 ∆ 15 14 7 0 
 ∆% 71 56 33 0 
  SPC post 36 39 .. .. 
Hungary  Pre 73 73 62 .. 
 Post 102 90 58 .. 
 ∆ 31 17 -4 .. 
 ∆% 40 23 -6 .. 
  SPC post 98 92 .. .. 
Latvia  Pre 46 46 42 30 
 Post 55 55 44 30 
 ∆ 11 11 2 0 
 ∆% 20 20 5 0 
  SPC post 55 55 .. .. 
Lithuania  Pre 34 40 35 .. 
 Post 45 51 41 .. 
 ∆ 11 11 6 .. 
 ∆% 32 28 17 .. 
  SPC post 42 50 ..   
Source: National reports; SPC: figures from “Current and prospective theoretical pension replacement rates”, Report 
by the Indicators Sub-Group of the SPC, 19 May 2006 – Table 4, Statutory pensions, and country tables, year 2050. 
 
Notes: 
Replacement rates are with the respect of average wage or 2/3 of average wage. Minimum pensions are relative to 
average wage. 
Pre – simulated pre-reform replacement rates, on the assumption that the pre-reform situation continues for 40 years 
using the same macroeconomic developments than the post-reform scenario. 
Post – simulated post-reform replacement rates 
∆ - absolute difference in post-reform and pre-reform replacement rates 
∆% - relative difference in post-reform and pre-reform replacement rates 
SPC post – simulated post-reform replacement rates from the Social Protection Committee study 
SPC ∆pp – absolute difference in post-reform and pre-reform replacement rates from the Social Protection 
Committee study 
Hungary – net replacement rates; other countries – gross replacement rates. 
Estonia – pensions for inactive persons will have additional subsistence benefits to top-up the pensions. 
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Bulgaria 
Source: Country report. 
Main assumptions: The replacement rates are calculated using both the pre-reform and post-
reform pension formula for a person retiring in 2006 and on the basis of the most recent data 
needed for the calculations. 
In case of career 30 years, the assumed break of the career is at the beginning. To accumulate 
pension rights he/she will be given a pension at the age of 65 calculated using the same pension 
formula. That pension cannot be less than 85% of the minimum amount of the general pension. 
Minimum general pension is BGN 85 for 2006. 
Estonia 
Source: Country report. 
Main assumptions similar to those in SPC study. 
Main base assumptions: inflation 2%; labour productivity and wages 3.2%; employment growth 
-0.4%; real increase in pension index 1.39%; real rate of return in the FF scheme (after 
administration fees) 2.6%. Return rate during the time of annuity payment was assumed at 3%. 
Unisex mortality tables. In case of career 30 years, the pattern 15-10-15 was used. 
Minimum pension: assumes that ratio of minimum pension to the base component remains 
unchanged. 
Latvia  
Source: Country report. Ministry of Finance. Main assumptions as in SPC study. No further 
details available. 
Lithuania 
Source: Country report. 
Calculations in “pre-reform” case were made for a person who, in all 40 years, did not join the 
FF scheme (non-switcher), and compared with a person who joined the FF scheme at the 
beginning (switcher who participated in the FF scheme for 40 years). 
Main assumptions: basic pension and official insured income will grow in line with average 
wage. Assumed real investment return 2.5%. Return rate during the time of annuity payment was 
assumed at 2%. Mortality tables are not unisex. No difference when the break in the career 
occurs. 
Hungary 
Source: Country report. Main assumptions as in SPC study. No further details available. 
Poland 
Source: Country report. Main assumptions as in SPC study. No further details available. 
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Minimum pension: Discretionary set flat-rate is not available for the post-reform scenario, but it 
is assumed that the ratio to average wage is unchanged. 
Slovakia 
Source: Country report. Based on INEKO pension calculator. 
Pre-reform replacement rates refer to year 2003. The reform of the PAYG was put in effect in 
2004. The fully funded pillar was introduced in 2005. Post-reform replacement rates refer to year 
2045.  
Main assumptions: real annual growth in earnings 2%; real annual rate of return 2.5%. Career 
break: average earnings lost due to 10-year child care at any time during the career. 
Minimum pension: After the reform, there is no minimum pension. People with low pensions 
may ask for a regular social assistance (welfare benefits), which was used for calculating the 
post-reform replacement rate (for a single person without children). The post-reform calculation 
is based on numbers valid for 2006. 
Sweden  
Source: Country report, referring to simulations made in “The Swedish National Strategy Report 
on Adequate and Sustainable Pensions”, 9 August 2005, 
http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/108/a/68150
Main assumptions: 40-year career; productivity and real wage development: 1.8 per cent; 
inflation: 2 per cent; real rate of return: 3 per cent. Housing supplement for pensioners is also 
included in the calculations. Private pension saving is excluded from the calculations. 
Minimum pension: A state tax-financed guarantee pension is paid to those who have not earned 
an adequate income-related pension themselves. The guarantee pension is expressed in terms of 
the price base amount and it is adjusted upwards every year with reference to the consumer price 
index. For those who do not qualify for a sufficiently large guarantee pension there is a so-called 
maintenance support for the elderly. A means-tested housing supplement may also be granted to 
those in need of it. Pre-reform replacement rate is around 35% and also housing supplement; 
post-reform replacement rate is more or less the same as in the old system. Occupational 
pensions not included. 
United Kingdom 
Source: Country report. 
Main assumptions: nominal earnings growth: 3.8%; inflation: 2.0%; real return on assets: 2.5%. 
For the post-reform scenario replacement rates are calculated using a 40 year forecast and 
applying all the reform components, mainly: retirement age is 68; eligibility criteria for state 
pension have been eased; Personal Accounts have been introduced. Remaining life expectancy at 
age 68 in 2051: males 18, females 20.5.  
Minimum pension: Inactive persons will not have any pension entitlement before the age of 80. 
The minimum pension payable from that age replaces 12.3% of average salary. Occupational 
pensions not included.
Annex 4 – Overview of data sources in the country reports 
The following table gives the overview of the data sources used by national experts. When the experts did not explicitly provide the data source 
in the country report, the table indicates the names of the country experts. 
 
Tables          Bulgaria Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Slovakia Sweden United Kingdom
2.1. For all: Eurostat database, ESSPROS data on pension expenditures, % of GDP, last updated 14 December 2007 
2.2, 2.3, 
2.4, 2.6 
NATIONAL 
SOCIAL 
SECURITY 
INSTITUTE, 
National 
Statistical 
Institute 
Estonian Ministry 
of Finance, 
Estonian National 
Social Insurance 
Board; expert’s 
calculations 
A.Simonovits; 
J.Szucs 
State Social Insurance 
Agency, Central 
Statistical Bureau 
T. Medaiskis 
KNF, ZUS, CSO, 
expert’s 
calculations 
Ministry of Labour, 
Social Affairs and 
Family, Social 
Insurance Agency, 
Statistical Office, 
expert’s 
calculations 
RFV: Social insurance 
expenditure in Sweden, 
different years. 
Försäkringskassan.  
Kruse and Palmer (2007) 
Government Actuary's 
Department (GAD): 
Report on drafts of the 
Social Security Benefits 
Uprating Order 2007, 
January 2007, expert’s 
calculations 
2.5 
NATIONAL 
SOCIAL 
SECURITY 
INSTITUTE 
State Pension 
Insurance Act 
A.Simonovits; 
J.Szucs 
Law On State Pensions, 
Law On State Funded 
Pensions 
T. Medaiskis Law on social insurance 
Act 274/1994 on 
Social Insurance 
Agency, Act 
461/2003 on Social 
Insurance, Act 
43/2004 on Old-
Age Savings 
RFV: Social insurance 
expenditure in Sweden, 
various years 
M. Zeeb 
2.7. Social Insurance Code 
Funded Pensions 
Act 
A.Simonovits; 
J.Szucs Law On State Pensions 
Law on Pension 
Accumulation Law on pensions 
Act Nr. 43/2004 on 
Old-Age Savings; 
Proposal of the 
amendment to the 
Act Nr. 461/2003 
on Social 
Insurance. 
Försäkringskassan: "Orange 
report. Annual Report of 
the Swedish Pension 
System 2006", 
Försäkringskassan: 
"Regelbok för 
Socialförsäkringen. 2007 
Department for Work and 
Pensions: Personal 
accounts - a new way to 
save, December 2006 
2.8.    - Funded Pensions Act 
Auguszti-
novics et al. 
2002 
Law On State Pensions Law on Pension Accumulation Law on pensions 
Act Nr. 43/2004 on 
Old-Age Savings; 
Proposal of the 
amendment to the 
Act Nr. 461/2003 
on Social 
Insurance. 
- -
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2.9. 
NATIONAL 
SOCIAL 
SECURITY 
INSTITUTE 
Estonian Central 
Depository for 
Securities; 
Statistics Estonia; 
expert’s 
calculations 
A.Simonovits; 
J.Szucs 
State Social Insurance 
Agency T. Medaiskis 
ZUS, KNF, 
expert’s 
calculations 
Social Insurance 
Agency, expert’s 
calculations 
Försäkringskassan: "Orange 
report. Annual Report of 
the Swedish Pension 
System 2006", 
Försäkringskassan: 
"Regelbok för 
Socialförsäkringen. 2007 
- 
2.10.         
  
-
Estonian Central 
Depository for 
Securities; 
Statistics Estonia; 
expert’s 
calculations 
- - T. Medaiskis - - - -
2.11. 
National Social 
Security 
Institute 
Estonian Central 
Depository for 
Securities; 
Estonian National 
Social Insurance 
Board; expert’s 
calculations 
- State Social Insurance Agency T. Medaiskis - 
Social Insurance 
Agency - -
2.12 
(also 
expert 
opinions) 
National Social 
Security 
Institute, 
National 
Statistical 
Institute, Social 
Insurance Code, 
Regulation for 
recategorisation 
of labour for 
retirement 
State Pension 
Insurance Act 
A.Simonovits; 
J.Szucs Law On State Pensions 
Law on State 
Social Insurance 
Pensions; National 
Strategy Report 
on Adequate and 
Sustainable 
Pensions 
Law on pensions, 
Ministry of Labour 
and Social Policy 
Act Nr. 461/2003 
on Social 
Insurance, Proposal 
of the amendment 
to the Act Nr. 
461/2003 on Social 
Insurance. 
Försäkringskassan: "Orange 
report. Annual Report of 
the Swedish Pension 
System 2006", 
Försäkringskassan: 
"Regelbok för 
Socialförsäkringen. 2007 
Department for Work and 
Pensions: Security in 
retirement - towards a 
new pension system, p. 
88-92,  
State Pensions Act 2007. 
2.13. Social Insurance Code 
State Pension 
Insurance Act 
A.Simonovits; 
J.Szucs Law On State Pensions T. Medaiskis Law on pensions 
Act Nr. 274/1994 
on Social Insurance 
Agency, Act Nr. 
461/2003 on Social 
Insurance 
A. Kruse M. Zeeb 
2.14. 
National Social 
Security 
Institute 
Statistics Estonia; 
Estonian National 
Social Insurance 
Board; expert’s 
calculations 
A.Simonovits; 
J.Szucs 
State Social Insurance 
Agency, expert’s 
calculations  
Department of 
Statistics ZUS 
Social Insurance 
Agency, INEKO 
Expert’s calculations using: 
Försäkringskassan:  ”Det 
ekonomiska utfallet inom 
pensionssystemet de senaste 
10 åren.” Promemoria, 
2007-06-01, SCB: 
”Inkomstfördelningsunders
- 
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ökningen 2005.” Statistiska 
meddelanden. HE 21 SM 
0701. 
2.15 and 
2.16 
Social Insurance 
Code; Labour 
Code 
Funded Pensions 
Act; Estonian 
National Social 
Insurance Board, 
Social Tax Act 
A.Simonovits; 
J.Szucs 
Law On State Social 
Insurance, Law On 
Maternity and Sickness 
Insurance, Law On 
State Funded Pensions, 
Law On Unemployment 
Insurance 
State Social 
Insurance Act 
Law on social 
insurance; Law on 
pensions;  
 
Act Nr. 274/1994 
on Social Insurance 
Agency, Act Nr. 
461/2003 on Social 
Insurance, Act Nr. 
43/2004 on Old-
Age Savings, 
Proposal of the 
amendment to the 
Act Nr. 461/2003 
on Social Insurance 
Försäkringskassan: "Orange 
report. Annual Report of 
the Swedish Pension 
System 2006", 
Försäkringskassan: 
"Regelbok för 
Socialförsäkringen. 2007 
Pension Commission: 
Second Report 
(November 2005) and 
Final Report (April 2006). 
Department for Work and 
Pensions: Security in 
retirement: towards a new 
pension system, May 
2006. 
DWP: Security in 
retirement - towards a 
new pension system. 
Summary of responses to 
the consultation, October 
2006; 
Pensions Act 2007 
Social Security (Credits) 
Regulations 1975; Job 
Seekers Act 1995. 
2.17. G.  Shopov. Funded Pensions Act 
A.Simonovits; 
J.Szucs J. Muizniece T. Medaiskis M. Zukowski P. Golias A. Kruse M. Zeeb 
2.18. 
National Social 
Security 
Institute 
Eurostat database Eurostat database J. Muizniece 
Department of 
Statistics, expert’s 
calculations 
M. Zukowski Statistical Office Statistics, Sweden. Population statistics. 
Interim Life Tables 2003-
2005 (period life 
expectancy), Office for 
National Statistics 
2.19.       
  
- - - - -
P. Golias based on 
INEKO pension 
calculator, Act Nr. 
100/1988 on Social 
Security, Act Nr. 
461/2003 on Social 
Insurance 
Regeringskansliet: The 
Swedish National Strategy 
Report; July 2005 
M. Zeeb 
2.20. G. Shopov
L. Leppik, 
A.Võrk 
A.Simonovits; 
J.Szucs J. Muizniece T. Medaiskis - - - - 
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2.21, 
2.24. 
Social Insurance 
Code 
Funded Pensions 
Act 
Government 
decree 
282/2001, 
Law 82/1997 
Law On State Funded 
Pensions 
Law on the 
Supplementary 
Voluntary 
Accumulation of 
Pensions NoVIII-
1212; Pension 
Accumulation Law 
No IX-1691, 
Lithuanian 
Association of 
Financial Analysts: 
www.finansai.lt
Law on pension 
funds, Ordinance 
of the Minister of 
Finance, Ordinance 
of the Council of 
Ministers 
Act Nr. 43/2004 on 
Old-Age Savings A. Kruse 
Pension Commission: 
Second Report, M.Zeeb 
2.22.    
      
-
Estonian Central 
Register of 
Securities 
- J. Muizniece
Law on the 
Supplementary 
Voluntary 
Accumulation of 
Pensions NoVIII-
1212; Pension 
Accumulation Law 
No IX-1691; 
- Act Nr. 43/2004 on Old-Age Savings 
PPM; 
https://secure.ppm.nu/tpp/in
vestmentadvisor/7:1;:1:1;20
0937;: 
- 
2.23. -
Estonian Central 
Register of 
Securities 
- J. Muizniece T. Medaiskis -
Expert’s 
calculations based 
on data from the 
Social Insurance 
Agency 
PPM, Rapport 1:2007. 
Pensionsspararna 2006. - 
2.25. Social Insurance Code 
Funded Pensions 
Act; Decree of the 
Minister of Finance 
from 15 January 
2002, 
Pensionikeskus 
www.pensionikesk
us.ee 
A.Simonovits; 
J.Szucs, 
Law 82/1997 
State Social Insurance 
Agency 
Reports of the 
Securities 
Commission and 
Insurance 
Supervision 
Commission 
Law on pension 
funds 
Act Nr. 43/2004 on 
Old-Age Savings A. Kruse - 
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